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Effects of institutional distances on the expert-lay controversy in risk 
research and management. Introduction to the thesis. 
 
 
Abstract: This introduction to the four papers included in the thesis explains the choice of 
food risk as an empirical focus as well as the overall scope and theme of the thesis: to come to 
a more nuanced understanding of the expert-lay divide through focusing on the effects of 
institutional distances between the actors involved in risk analysis, risk management, risk 
communication and risk taking. Then a brief introduction to the theoretical framework is 
offered. From this point the remaining sections of this introduction serve the double purpose 
of summing up results and theoretical points from the individual papers and synthesizing 
between them.  
 
 
Introduction 
This thesis consists of four papers which address different aspects of risk. All the papers in the 
thesis relate one way or another to food risks, but food risks is not the core subject matter of 
the thesis. The overall theme is about how risks are defined, perceived, managed and 
communicated. However, the empirical focus on food risks is not a result of mere 
coincidence. During the past decades society has witnessed a number of food scares such as 
BSE, avian bird flu, E-Coli, Salmonella and Dioxin residues (Löfstedt 2006; Knowles 2007). 
New food risk topics related to novel foods and biotechnology such as GMO have added to 
the public concerns over food risks (Frewer et al. 2002; Sjöberg 2008). Obesity and other 
consequences of lifestyle related food risks cause severe health problems (Seiders 2004). 
Recently the growing concern about climate changes has led to significant public concern and 
media attention to the environmental impacts of food miles and green house gas emissions in 
food production (Weber and Matthews 2008). As a consequence of this development 
consumer concerns over food safety have increased steadily since the 1970s (Knox 2000). 
The sum of all these risks and the resulting societal anxiety are a politicization of food risks 
similar to that of risks related to new technologies.  The politicization of food risks is 
accompanied by increased public demands for regulation, which, similar to the case of 
regulating new technologies, lead to the necessity of a better understanding of what factors 
drive public attitudes towards those risks. Subsequently the studies of public perceptions of 
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food risks have increased steadily over the past decades (Löfstedt 2006, Hohl and Gaskel 
2008)). 
However, food risks are in many concerns different from the technological risks, which were 
in focus when the scholarly field of risk perception emerged and still remain the preferred 
objects of investigation (Löfstedt 2006). Technological risks such as nuclear power rarely 
involve any direct decision making from the individual consumer of energy, but we all have 
to make decisions about the food we eat. It may be that we have to tolerate or accept risks 
imposed on us by industry and regulators, e.g. pesticide residues. But unlike the case of 
nuclear technology we are confronted with a choice every time we enter a supermarket, and 
we can actively choose to take certain risks and protect ourselves against others, e.g. by 
avoiding certain risk items, choosing organic product etc. Because of these choices we 
actively engage ourselves in risk taking when confronted with food risks. The ambition to 
come to a better understanding of risk in a context where people both have something at stake 
and a possibility to influence the outcome through their decisions has been a major reason for 
the empirical choice of food risks in this thesis. 
 
The expert-lay divide in risk perception 
The definition, perception, management and communication of risk involve a number of 
different actors: Some actors are risks producers (e.g. industry) while others have to live with 
the potential consequences of risks (i.e. the citizen-consumers). In order to ensure acceptable 
risk levels political institutions regulate risks, and the risk regulators are informed by experts 
who analyze risks. Although overlaps between these groups exist (especially because 
everybody has to eat), in general the different groups tend to perceive risks differently; 
whether these differences are caused by factors such as level of knowledge, predicted 
exposure and/or benefit, level of involvement etc. 
The most studied and debated differences in risk perceptions are those found between experts 
and lay people. This gap, which is often described in terms of a ‘knowledge discrepancy’, 
emerged in various risk perception studies in the seventies that were conducted as a 
consequence of a general public skepticism towards nuclear technology (Slovic 2000; Sjöberg 
2006). Throughout the past 40 years studies have persistently pointed to the existence of such 
a knowledge discrepancy, more or less regardless of risk or hazard type (Brun 1994). Many 
studies have been conducted within the psychometric paradigm, which has grown into 
becoming the preferred method by most scholars of risk perception. However, the 
psychometric approach to studies of risk perception, which was developed by cognitive 
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psychologists interested in decision making, has met vast criticism. Sociologists within the 
theoretical framework of Science and Technology Studies have rejected the notion of a 
knowledge discrepancy (e.g. Irwin and Wynne 1996), especially when the expert-lay gap has 
been described as the result of a cognitive deficit (see e.g. Slovic et al. 2004). These critics are 
generally informed by findings within their own research tradition which rely heavily on 
qualitative studies (see e.g. Wynne 1996). But the psychometric approach has also been 
subject to criticism which, more directly, has questioned the psychometric method and the 
validity of the results (e.g. Sjöberg 1996; 2002). 
 
From risk perception to risk communication 
Those challenges to the psychometric paradigm are both important and interesting. Although 
the psychometric findings of differences in expert vis-à-vis lay attitudes towards risks are hard 
to neglect, they tend to be explained differently depending on the theoretical approach to the 
subject matter. The psychometric paradigm points to cognitive factors as the cause of these 
differences and the preferred remedy has not surprisingly been public education through risk 
communication (Slovic 1986). In the early stages of risk communication the preferred method 
was one-way dissemination of information from the knowledgeable experts to the ignorant 
public (see Fischhoff 1995 for a general overview of the various stages in risk 
communication). Although one-way communication may occasionally lead to good results 
(see Löfstedt 2005 for a critical discussion) the initial efforts to educate the public was met by 
a surprising unwillingness to be educated. From lessons learned in the initial stages of risk 
communication, risk communicators have along the way implemented more dialogical 
approaches in order to engage citizens in risk communication. However, those approaches to 
citizen engagement have been far less efficient than predicted (Rowe and Frewer 2000; Petts 
2004; Seifert 2006). 
The relatively poor results of risk communication indicate that the initial psychometric 
assumption, that the cognitive deficit would be eliminated by providing sufficient 
information, is wrong. This could either be because the gap between expert and lay attitudes 
to risk is not caused by a cognitive deficit or it could be that the communication means 
employed have been inadequate. In either way several questions arise: If not cognitive 
restraints and/or knowledge deficits then what produces this gap? And what are the conditions 
for bridging the gap? If the problem is not due to cognitive restraints and lack of knowledge, 
what should we expect from risk communication efforts? Questions like these – as well as the 
scientific debates over their answers – have motivated this thesis. 
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The theoretical framework 
Methods for coping with uncertainty in relation to decision making can be traced back to 3200 
B.C. (Covello and Mumpower 1985). The term ‘risk’, however, did not appear until the 
transitional period between the late middle ages and the early renaissance (Luhmann 1993: 9). 
The introduction of probability theory by Pascal in 1657 as a rational foundation for decision 
making with an uncertain, and possibly adverse, outcome, led to the establishment of a 
definition of risk, which is reflected in contemporary risk definitions: Most current definitions 
of risk include an estimate of uncertainty (probability) about an event and the severity of its 
consequences (Drottz-Sjöberg 1991; Brun 1994).  Ortwin Renn furthermore observes that 
“[a]ll risk concepts have one element in common, however: the distinction between reality 
and possibility”.  When this distinction is accepted, “the term ‘risk’ is often associated with 
the possibility that an undesirable state of reality (adverse effects) may occur as a result of 
natural events or human activities (Renn 1998).  
But this is as far the agreement over the concept of risk goes. There is no general agreement 
about the relative importance of probability and severity (Drottz-Sjöberg 1991). Thus, the risk 
literature is far from unequivocal when it comes to whether uncertainty should be expressed 
in terms of probability, expected value or simply as uncertainty (Aven and Renn 2009). 
Furthermore the severity of consequences may be distributed unequally among a population, 
thus changing the perspective from ‘How safe is safe enough?’ (Fischhoff et al. 1978) to 
‘How fair is safe enough?’ (Raynor 1987). And even with an equal distribution of 
consequences the combination of probability and severity will lead to different results 
depending on whether the yardstick of risk measurement is reduced life expectancy, deaths 
per hour of risk exposure etc. (Slovic 1998). All these tensions, which are present in the field 
of risk research, can be summarized with Slovic’s (1999) evaluation of ‘the risk-assessment 
battlefield’: “… polarized views, controversy, and overt conflict have become pervasive 
within risk assessment and risk management. […] This dissatisfaction can be traced in part to 
a failure to appreciate the complex and socially determined nature of the concept ‘‘risk’’’. 
 
A brief overview of the field of risk research 
The various branches of risk research reflect the complexity of the risk concept. In order to 
create a general overview of risk research Ortwin Renn (1992) has made a systematic 
classification of risk perspectives. While all approaches to various degrees deal with how to 
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cope with uncertainty the left part of the table focuses on risk assessment and the right part on 
political legitimation.  
 
INTEGRATED APPROACHES (e.g. Social Amplification of Risk) 
 
 Actuarial 
Approach 
Toxicology 
Epidemiology 
Probabilistic 
Risk 
Analysis 
Economics  
of Risk 
Psychology  
of Risk 
Social Theories 
of Risk 
Cultural 
Theories of 
Risk 
 
Base Unit Expected 
Value (EV) 
Modelled 
Value 
Synthesized 
Value 
Expected 
Utility (EU) 
Subjectively 
Expected 
Utility 
Percieved 
Fairness & 
Competence 
Sharewd 
Values 
Predominant 
Method 
Extrapolation Experiments Event & Fault 
Tree Analysis 
Risk-Benefit 
Analysis 
Psychometrics Surveys Grid-Group 
Analysis 
Health 
Surveys 
Structured 
Analysis 
Scope of Risk 
Concept 
Universal Health & 
Environment 
Safety Universal Individual 
Perceptions 
Social Interests Cultural 
Clusters 
One-
Dimensional 
One-
Dimensional 
One-
Dimensional 
One-
Dimensional 
Multi-
Dimensional 
Multi-
Dimensional 
Multi-
Dimensional 
Basic 
Problem 
Areas 
Avaraging over space, time, context Preference Aggregation Social Relativism 
Predictive 
Power 
Transfer to 
Humans 
Common 
Mode failure 
Common 
Denominator 
Social 
Relevance 
Complexity Empirical 
Validity 
Inventing 
Variables 
Major 
Application 
Insurance Health Safety 
Engineering 
Decision 
Making 
Policy Making and Regulation 
Environmental 
Protection 
Conflict Resolution (Mediation) 
Risk Communication 
Instrumental 
Function 
Risk Sharing Early Warnings Ressource 
Allocation 
Individual 
Assessment 
Equity Fairness Cultural 
Identity 
Standard 
Setting 
Improving 
Systems 
Political 
Acceptance 
Social 
Function 
 
Assessment 
Risk Reduction and Policy Selection 
(coping with Uncertainty) Political  
Legitimation 
Table 1. A systematic classification of risk perspectives (adopted from Renn 1992: 57) 
 
In the three first technological approaches to risk the expert-lay divide represents a rather 
unwelcome obstacle, since the researchers within these approaches constitute the formal risk 
expertise. But this obstacle is not an object of investigation within these approaches and for 
this reason the thesis will not employ theories pertinent to these approaches. The theoretical 
domain of risk perception, risk management and risk communication is by and large to be 
14 
 
found in the last three approaches (psychological, social and cultural) and to some degree the 
economic approach. As the thesis focuses on the lay-expert divide it has been natural to draw 
on theories within these approaches. 
 
The two cultures of risk research 
Slovic (1999) describes the domain of risk assessment as a battlefield. Jasanoff (1993) 
illustrates the conflict by pointing to how the technological vis-à-vis social approaches to risk 
analysis represents two distinct cultures of risk research. Bridging these cultures is far from 
being a straightforward task as differences in meta-theoretical assumptions reflect gaps whose 
proportions are similar to the empirical gaps found between experts and lay people. Especially 
the ontological status of risk has been a dividing factor in risk research (see Aven and Renn 
2009; 2010; Rosa 2010 for a recent discussion). The early work within the psychometric 
paradigm conceived risks to be real and this approach fitted nicely into the technological 
approaches in terms of risk ontology. And even with the psychometric re-conceptualization of 
risk as a social construct the general structure of a difference between expert and lay 
perceptions of risk is maintained, thus minimizing the practical impact of this new meta-
theoretical orientation. But to some scholars within the social science approaches to risk it has 
been an important task to provide a more solid meta-theoretical foundation for risk research 
and reduce the ‘ontological gap’ between technical and social science approaches. These 
efforts have been termed critical realism or reconstructed realism (Renn 1998; Rosa 1998; 
2003) or critical realism (Renn 1998). Still other social scientists, especially within the STS 
framework locate themselves as distant as possible from the realist perspective on risks so that 
the field of risk research is characterized by one major ‘ontological gap’ as well as several 
minor gaps. 
 
How this thesis places itself within the field of risk research 
The Social Amplification of Risk Framework (Kaspersen et al. 1988; Pidgeon et al. 2003) is 
an attempt to bring together the different and often conflicting approaches to risk. To some 
degree the framework has been successful; scholars from different approaches have been 
brought together into this holistic framework. But as a platform for theoretical developments 
the framework has been less successful. Scholars from different approaches have replicated 
their existing theoretical assumptions without the framework being capable of integrating 
them into any kind of theoretical development. In this sense the framework rather reflects than 
solves the problems of mediating between the different approaches to risk. 
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The focus on institutional distances in this thesis is conceptually affiliated with the idea of the 
Social Amplification of Risk Framework that social dynamics influence risk perceptions 
through effects of amplification or attenuation. But while the notion of risk amplification (as 
well as risk attenuation) implicitly reflects a contestable point of departure, namely that 
correct risk perceptions corresponding to real risks are somewhat distorted through social 
dynamics, this thesis contests both the realist and the essentialist assumptions behind the idea 
that risk amplification leads to wrong or inappropriate risk perceptions. As elaborated upon in 
the first paper, entitled ‘The constitutive element of probabilistic agency in risk. A semantic 
analysis of risk, danger, chance and hazard’, the thesis holds that: 1) Risk is subjectively 
defined, because 2) risk is not a quality of the hazard or risk source (the essentialist 
perspective) but rather a quality of the relation between the subject as a potential target and 
the risk source (a relational perspective). 
This subjective perspective on risk, however, does not imply a radical “social constructivist 
view in which risk is treated as a subjective narrative that cannot be evaluated according to 
criteria of truth or appropriateness” (Aven and Renn 2010). Drawing on Searle’s distinction 
between brute facts and institutional fact, the thesis holds that risk is an institutional, or social, 
fact, which is defined by its social function. Searle (1995) makes a sharp distinction between 
brute facts (i.e. natural phenomena) and institutional fact, which rely on social conventions. 
But as he emphasizes, the social reality of institutional facts fits into a larger ontology of 
objective fact. Thus, the concept of risk would be pointless if no real dangers existed.  But 
risk belongs to a subjective ontology that “exists only in relation to the intentionality of 
agents” (Searle 1995: 10). In this sense the thesis argues that the concept of risk is inseparable 
from the social activity of risk taking.   
 
The effects of institutional distances on risk assessment and attitudes towards hazards 
It is a fundamental assumption throughout this thesis that societal or institutional distances 
play a significant role for the perception of risks. This assumption is, inter alia, motivated and 
inspired by Herbert Simon’s theory of bounded rationality (Simon 1947; 1957), where the 
rationality of decision making is influenced by a variety of organizational factors.  Simon has 
been a major source of inspiration to the Oregon group which founded the psychometric 
paradigm (Slovic et al. 1974). But while the ‘boundedness’ of lay people’s rationalities is well 
documented in innumerous psychometric studies, the psychometric approach seeks the 
explanations for this boundedness in cognitive rather than organizational or institutional 
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factors. The focus is on the individual’s psychology and not how the individual is situated in 
an organizational or any other societal setting.  
 
Risk and the functional differentiation of society 
Another equally important source of inspiration has been the systems theory of Niklas 
Luhmann (see Luhmann 1995 for a general overview of the theory). To Luhmann the concept 
of risk is inseparable from decision making; risk is a decision where someone chooses to put 
something at stake in order to gain a benefit in the future (Luhmann 1993). But as it is 
impossible to gain total control over the future through risk decisions, danger constitutes a 
residual effect which is beyond human control. The distinction between risk and danger is a 
cornerstone in Luhmann’s analytical sociology of risk. At first glance it may seem 
paradoxical, since risk and danger are treated as both distinct and identical concepts. But this 
distinction makes it possible to maintain a double perspective on risk, thus explaining how 
time affects the concept of risk on its course from decision to manifested consequences.  
According to Luhmann, danger is attributed to external factors, as opposed to the risk which is 
attributed to the decision. In this sense risk involves agency (control by decision making) 
whereas danger is something we tolerate as passive objects because it is beyond our control. 
What is risk to the decision maker is at the same time danger to those affected. But according 
to Luhmann, even the decision maker will be confronted with danger once the decision has 
been made and he faces the threat from an adverse outcome. As such the distinction between 
risk and danger does not pertain to different individuals but rather to different perspectives or, 
as this thesis suggests, to distinct institutional positions. According to Luhmann, the 
separation of risk and danger is first and foremost pertinent to a difference in perspective 
which evolves over time: The concept of risks serves to bind time by linking the actual (which 
is present) to the potential (which resides in the future). But attempts to control the future 
through risk decisions will at some point have to face the fact that the contingency of any 
future is bound to become the present, which by its nature appears as more deterministic, 
simply because it is what actually happens. So when risk decisions reach the point where 
consequences occur, the future has become the present and risk has become danger.  
When risk becomes a social problem it is because those affected by risk decisions are 
separated from the decision makers in what Luhmann refers to as a ‘functionally 
differentiated society’(Luhmann 1995). In this sense it is not the risk as such that causes 
social problems (manifested in protest movements and demands for risk mitigation) but rather 
the distribution of dangers that affect those not involved in the risk decision. From the 
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perspective of an individual risk taker, facing dangers as a residual effect of the risk decision 
is a tolerable by-product, because the benefits of the risk decision in general outweigh those 
dangers. But many risks are beyond the control and decisions of individuals: Technological 
risks associated with nuclear power and chemical plants are the results of decisions made by 
industry and regulators.  
 
One result of the separation between decision and consequence is that people may question 
the fairness of how societal risk consequences (i.e. dangers) are distributed; leading to 
questions such as ‘how fair is safe enough?’ (Raynor and Cantor 1987). But from this 
perspective it is plausible to infer that it is the disengagement from the decision making 
process that causes most lay people to evaluate societal risks in terms of their consequences 
rather than in terms of their probability. Sjöberg has found that it is the severity of 
consequences which is most important in driving policy attitudes towards new technologies, 
whereas the question of probability plays an insignificant role (Sjöberg 1998; 1999; 2000). 
Thus, Sjöberg argues that “‘risk’ is a concept most closely related to the probability of 
unwanted events and hence its usefulness for understanding policy attitudes is limited, if not 
altogether non-existent” (Sjöberg 2000). It is not unreasonable to assume a connection 
between lay people’s bias towards disregarding the element of probability in their risk 
assessments and the fact that the risks they are to assess are imposed on them rather than 
being a result of their own choice. Probability may be considered a ‘guide of life’ (Good 
1959) for decision makers, but the usefulness of probability to those without choices may be 
limited. 
 
An intra-societal adaption of institutional distance 
Luhmann’s analytical sociology of risk offers a possible explanation for the differences 
between expert and lay perceptions of risk: they are ultimately produced by a functional 
differentiation of society where experts perceive risk from a decision perspective while lay 
people perceive risk from a consequence perspective. These perspectives are separated by 
time for the individual risk taker. But for large-scale technological risks the perspectives are 
separated by institutional distances.  
The concept of institutional distance, as it is used in this thesis, is borrowed from the strategic 
management literature. Originally it was conceived to capture differences between 
institutional environments of two countries (Kostova 1999). The concept is inscribed in a neo-
institutionalistic approach to social theory where institutional environments are defined by 
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regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive factors (Scott 2001). Regulative factors refer to 
how governments and regulatory bodies regulate society through laws and other requirements. 
Normative factors include the societal values and norms that direct behavior through social 
obligations and expectations. Cultural-cognitive factors imply a framework of basic 
assumptions which result in “prefabricated organizing models and script of actions”. Thus, a 
common framework of meaning is established, justifying certain types of action while making 
other types inconceivable. 
 In this thesis the focus on institutional distance, however, does not involve comparative 
studies of different countries or societies. Rather the concept of institutional distance is 
adapted to explain differences in risk perceptions on an intra-societal level and how the 
effects of institutional distances are reflected in differences regarding influence over decision 
processes and in world views1
 
. Thus, the concept of institutional distance reflects that 
distances between actors and organizations in a societal setting is not just a matter of 
geography.  
How to study risks through the lenses of institutional distances 
Adams (1995: 16) advocates that “the starting point of any theory of risk must be that 
everyone willingly takes risks”. But as he concludes, this is far from the starting point of most 
of the literature on risk. Although the distinction between voluntary and involuntary risks has 
been has been central to the research literature on risk perception from its earliest studies 
(Starr 1969), the focus on large-scale societal risks has directed attention towards risk 
tolerance at the expense of risk taking. As Sjöberg (1999) explains: ”[T]he special problem of 
risk seeking behavior, such as mountain climbing…is exceptional, and requires a very 
different discussion. Normally risks are disliked.” While mountain climbing may be a 
peripheral niche within risk seeking behavior, this thesis is based on the assumption that all 
risks at some level are closely affiliated with risk seeking, or at least risk taking, behavior. 
                                                          
1 In risk perception studies the concept of world views is often associated with Mary Douglas’ Cultural 
Theory, where worldviews fit into a group-grid matrix resulting in four archetypical worldviews. The 
present use of the word is more in accordance with its heritage from German philosophy where 
Dilthey explains that: “Weltanschauungen [i.e., “worldviews”] are not products of reflection. They are 
not the fruit of the mere will to know. The perception of reality is an important force in their 
formation, but only one. They arise from the process of life, from our experience of life, from the 
structure of our psychic totality. The ascendance of life to consciousness, in the knowledge of reality, 
the acceptance and appreciation of life, and the accomplishments of the will – this is the slow and 
difficult work that mankind has performed in the development of its Weltanschauungen” (cited from 
Goodale 2009:152). In this sense the concept of world view is comparable with how a system observes 
its environment in Luhmann’s systems theory. 
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Large scale technological risks only exist because somebody, e.g. industry and regulators, has 
made a decision which involves risk taking. Even the relationship between humans and 
natural hazards such as floods has to involve decision options (evacuation, building dams, 
buying insurance policy etc.) if the hazards are to be meaningfully conceived as risks. If no 
decision options exist, risk calculations will be pointless and risk taking impossible.  
The negligence of risk taking is particular evident in the technical literature on risk where 
agency is clearly associated with the risk source and humans are defined as objects of 
exposure (see Christensen et al. 2003 for an overview of the technical risk terminology). But 
contrary to the general belief within the technical literature on risk, the thesis argues that it is 
human agency, and not technical systems or natural phenomena, that causes risk. 
However, the focus on humans as objects of risk exposure is justifiable. Many large-scale 
technological risks imply that lay people are not actively engaged in the decision making 
which produces the risk. As a consequence the functional differentiation of society (Luhmann 
1995), the institutional distance from risk decision to risk consequence is huge. Because of 
this institutional distance most lay people find themselves in a position as passive targets of 
risk exposure stemming from decisions made elsewhere in society. Thus, the thesis pursues 
the assumption that it is the institutional distances between risk decision and risk consequence 
that causes experts and lay people to perceive risk differently: In short, it is the distance that 
makes the difference.   
 
Research strategies 
At first glance the focus on institutional distances points to a preference for studying risks as a 
social phenomenon and hence to inscribe the thesis in a sociological tradition. However this is 
not the intention. The empirical studies in the thesis employ methods that can be categorized 
as psychological as well as sociological and the choice of data collecting methods as well as 
overall research designs have been driven purely by the nature of the empirical phenomena 
under study. The focus on institutional distances is motivated by the assumption that while 
such distances do exist (e.g. the distance from risk decision to risk consequence or from risk 
expert to risk source) it would be fruitful to take them into consideration – regardless of 
whether a given study deals with individualistic or societal concerns over risks. 
The ambition to take these institutional differences into account is carried through in the two 
empirical studies which constitute the empirical core of the thesis; one exploring how lay 
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people perceive food risks and one exploring how food risks are reported from risk source to 
risk expert.  
 
The focus on institutional distance has two important consequences for how risks are studied 
in this thesis: 
1. In the first empirical study the risk perceptions of lay people are examined in a way 
that takes the element of risk taking into account by asking the respondents questions 
which reflect decisions they actually make. In this sense the research design tries to 
compensate for or bypass the effects of institutional distances, which cause a 
separation of risk decision and risk consequence.  
2. In the second empirical study the alleged simple structure of experts’ risk perception is 
challenged by an examination of the entire network of risk expertise, from the lowest 
organizational level where risks are produced to the higher levels where the formal 
risk expertise is situated. The research design in this study seeks to broaden the 
individualistic perspective on the risk expert to an exploration of the institutional 
distances within a network of expertise. 
 
These two approaches to studying risks represent two very different research strategies which 
underlie the two empirical studies of the thesis.  
The study of risk expertise seeks to understand the conditions for risk rationality in a network 
with multiple actors, thereby transcending the individualistic approach in psychological 
studies of expert perception of risk. The implications of this approach is discussed more in 
detail in the section ‘How do institutional contexts and communication flows affect the 
conditions for rational risk expertise?’ The overall ambition of this research design is to focus 
on institutional distances in order to take into account the organizational factors which are left 
aside in individualistic psychological approaches. Thus, the study contributes to the criticism 
raised against the alleged simple structure of experts’ risk perception in risk research (Sjöberg 
2002). 
 
Limitations of the studies 
At this point it is important to note that the two empirical studies are not comparable in any 
sense. They study different objects and employ very different methods. The only thing that 
binds the studies together is the idea of an expert-lay divide as conceptualized in risk 
perception research. Because the empirical studies are so dissimilar, the thesis is not based on 
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a single method but employs a wide range of methods pertinent to the individual studies. For 
similar reasons the thesis is not limited to one all-embracing research question and it does not 
aim at an all-embracing conclusion. The specific research aims, methods and findings 
pertinent to the individual papers will, together with relevant research literature, be explained 
more thoroughly in the papers.   
 
Aim and outline of the thesis 
The theme of the thesis is embedded in this expert-lay controversy. As such it is not solely an 
investigation into the specific nature of food risks. The four papers in the thesis are at the 
same time contributions to the ongoing discussion about the existence of, and possible 
challenges associated with, the expert-lay divide in risk perception and its consequences for 
risk communication and risk management. The overall aim of the thesis is to come to an 
understanding of the expert-lay divide through focusing on the effects of institutional 
distances between the various actors which produce, analyze, regulate, tolerate, communicate 
about and most importantly take risks.  
 
The composition of the thesis 
The composition of the thesis is based on this introduction followed by four individual papers, 
each of which has their own scope and focus: 
The first (introduction) paper accounts for the general idea behind this thesis. It describes the 
empirical focus and the research aim and it provides an overall theoretical foundation. In 
addition this paper seeks to synthesize  the remaining papers. 
The second paper entitled ‘The constitutive element of probabilistic agency in risk. A 
semantic analysis of risk, danger, chance and hazard’ defines the core terminology and 
accounts for the meta-theoretical position of the thesis. But the paper is simultaneously an 
autonomous contribution to an ongoing debate about the definition and ontological status of 
risk. The paper is not purely conceptual as its theoretical points are informed by a semantic 
analysis of central concepts in the risk terminology. 
The third paper entitled ‘Consumer Perceptions of Everyday Food Risks’ contains one of the 
two empirical studies of risk in this thesis; in this case the consumers’ perceptions of food 
risks. The methodological approach taken in this study is to some extent based on the 
discussion and findings in the previous paper.  
The fourth paper entitled ‘Institutionalized ignorance as a precondition for rational risk 
expertise’ contains the second empirical study of risk; in this case the effects of institutional 
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contexts on risk expertise. This is a case study of risk reporting procedures in the Danish 
division of a multinational food service company.  
The fifth paper entitled ‘Risk Communication and Citizen Engagement: What to Expect from 
Dialogue’ uses the Danish Consensus Conferences as a case in point for a theoretical 
discussion concerning the role of citizen engagement through dialogue in risk communication. 
While the two previous papers each addresses one of  the two sides of the expert-lay gap, this 
paper offers a theoretical explanation for why it is so difficult to bridge this gap through 
public dialogue. 
 
The following sections serve a double purpose: To sum up results and theoretical points of the 
four papers and to synthesize between them in order to account for the general idea behind 
this thesis. 
 
What do we mean by risk? 
As Slovic (1999) states any “attempt to study risk has to confront the question of ‘What is 
risk?’” This question is raised in the second paper of the thesis entitled ‘The constitutive 
element of probabilistic agency in risk. A semantic analysis of risk, danger, chance and 
hazard’.  
The paper is a contribution to a recent debate in Journal of Risk Research on the definition of 
risk. This debate has revitalized a general discussion in risk research concerning the 
ontological status of risk. Aven and Renn (2009) set out to challenge the widely accepted 
definition of risk proposed by Rosa (1998; 2003) which assumes risk to be an objective fact. 
While agreeing with Rosa that the concept of risk is better expressed in terms of uncertainty 
than in terms of probability, Aven and Renn (2010) insist that “uncertainty must be someone’s 
uncertainty” and therefore the concept of risk cannot escape the element of subjectivism. 
 
Risk and probabilistic agency 
Based on previous studies of risk in corpus linguistics (Fillmore and Atkins 1994; Hamilton et 
al. 2007) and a semantic analysis of the terms risk, danger, chance and hazard the paper 
identifies a distinct presence of what is termed probabilistic agency as a constitutive element 
of the risk concept. The term probabilistic agency emphasizes the subjective agency involved 
in probability calculations. That ordinary people engage themselves in probability calculations 
is not meant to denote engagement in advanced statistical operations. As evidenced by 
Tversky and Kahneman (1974) people more often than not make probability calculations 
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through various shortcuts or heuristics. These heuristics may bias the results and call for 
advanced statistics in order to obtain more accurate results, but this is irrelevant to the point 
being made: namely that even ordinary people use probability in order to predict uncertain 
outcomes.  
Both Rosa (2010) and Aven/Renn (2009; 2010) make a clear distinction between risk as a 
concept and its practical application. This distinction enables both parties in the discussion to 
locate uncertainty on the conceptual level, while probability is considered a useful tool in the 
practical application of the concept. However, the paper argues that risk, in the sense that it is 
a subjective – and not objective – fact, cannot be separated from its social function (Searle 
1995). Therefore it is impossible to distinguish risk from its practical application. In short, the 
paper argues that risk only exists because somebody takes a risk and that this activity involves 
some kind of probability estimations. Furthermore, the paper finds that uncertainty is not an 
adequate component when defining risk, since subjects (and even technical systems) can 
tolerate some level of uncertainty without acting upon it. In this sense, the paper argues, it is 
more adequate to base a risk definition on probability, because probability involves agency, 
understood as an activity that seeks to gain control over uncertainty.  
The general focus on institutional distances in the thesis plays an important, although not very 
explicit, role in this paper. Defining risk in terms of probabilistic agency means that someone 
has to act in order for a risk to exist. This act may have consequences for that someone – or 
for someone else. Thus, some take risks while others tolerate risks. If risk is defined 
objectively, correct assessment is possible and the problem of ‘incorrect’ risk perceptions is 
likely to result in discussions about cognitive restraints. But if risk is defined as something 
someone takes, ‘incorrect’ risk perceptions perhaps merely reflect that probability is a more 
salient concern for someone taking a risk than for someone tolerating a risk. The latter has no 
direct influence over the risk, so his/her stake in the risk is consequences (and not 
probability).   
 
The social reality of risk 
The semantic analysis shows that the act of gaining control over uncertainty is semantically 
embedded in the risk concept. The immediate consequence of this finding is that if the 
concept of risk is to be in accordance with the everyday usage of the word, it should be 
defined subjectively. Thus, risk cannot be an ontological fact, at least if the concept is to be in 
accordance with its everyday usage. For this reason (and several others) the paper as well as 
the remainder of the thesis defines risk as a social construct. But as noted before, defining risk 
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in terms of a social reality does not necessarily lead to a radical social constructivist view on 
risk. Dangers are real in the sense that they exist independently of our understanding of them, 
and human risk taking is based on the knowledge (including knowledge about lack of 
knowledge) of the dangers that may occur in the future. 
 
How do lay people perceive food risks in situations which involve choice? 
The third paper of the thesis entitled ‘Consumer Perceptions of Food Risks: How do 
Consumers Assess the Risk of Concrete Food Products?’ is based on the assumption that 
despite the recent focus on concepts such as citizen-consumer and political consumer, people 
tend to behave as consumers in purchase situations and as citizens in political situations. 
 
Risk items reflecting political concerns vis-à-vis consumer concerns  
The idea that consumers act politically through their consumption is appealing but results tend 
to be overrated (Boström et al. 2005).  A recent study of political consumption in Denmark, a 
country which has coined the concept of political consumerism and which is generally 
considered to be a forerunner in this area, reveals that only a small minority of the political 
consumers act in accordance with their political beliefs (Halkier and Holm 2008). Most of the 
alleged political consumerism is merely verbalized and not acted upon. So the case is that 
when consumers are confronted with consumer decisions they tend to act as consumers and 
not as political activists. In other words: If we explain political consumerism as an irrational 
element that neglects the economics of rational choice, people tend to be irrational grumblers 
but rational actors.  
The reason for this could be that in a purchase situation people put something very dear to 
them at stake (i.e. their money), whereas political beliefs and statements are free.  
The main reason for including products and not specific risk items such as salmonella and 
pesticide residues is that many of these items are merely tolerated and not as such chosen by 
the consumers. They may be a side-effect of a concrete product, but since many risk items do 
not offer any benefits, it is on the product level that risk-benefit tradeoffs are made. It is also 
at the product level that consumers put something at stake (their money and health) and can 
influence the outcome, simply because consumers make (risk) decisions concerning products, 
but not necessarily concerning specific risk items. The consequences of exposing oneself to a 
specific hazard or risk item will of course play a role in the purchase decision. But in the end 
the purchase decision is about a product and not about a specific risk item. 
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The ambition behind the study in this paper is to capture the risk perceptions of consumers in 
a situation where they think as consumers. Thus, the study presents respondents to concrete 
food products and not specific risk items, that may be subject to ‘outrage’ (Sandman 1987) 
which is motivated by political rather than consumer concerns. As it is a fundamental 
assumption in the thesis that institutional distance, rather than risks as such, cause this 
outrage, the study aims at capturing the consumer risk perceptions in a way that so to speak 
bypasses the effects of institutional distances.  From this perspective it is hypothesized that 
the element of control over risk will be less significant as compared to studies based on 
specific food risk items. 
 
Benefits matter – risks are less important 
Many studies following the tradition from the psychometric method have pointed to how 
dread and knowledge are the most salient factors in consumer perceptions of food risks (e.g. 
Sparks and Shepherd 1994; Fife-Schaw and Rowe 1996; 2000; Kirk et al. 2002). However, 
some studies have shown that there are significant individual differences among consumers’ 
perceptions of food risks (Siegrist et al. 2006) – echoing a general critique of the 
psychometric method and its use of aggregated data (Sjöberg 1996; 2002). Other studies 
reveal important differences in risk perceptions across different risk items (Miles and Frewer 
2001; Williams and Hammit 2001). 
The study in this paper takes a particular interest in what role the presented risk items play in 
consumers’ perception of food risks. This methodological aspect appears to have great 
influence on the results of risk perception studies. If, for example, consumers are asked to rate 
specific risk items such as salmonella and campylobacter, they will perceive risks to be 
significantly higher, compared to how they perceive similar food safety risks in their local 
supermarket (Senauer 1993). 
The study is to some degree based on the same methods as psychometric studies of food risk 
perception. Similar to the study by Fife-Schaw and Rowe (1996), risk characteristics are 
based on data from focus groups, but as the participants were confronted with concrete food 
products and not specific risk items, the risk characteristics turned out to be very different. 
The statistical data analysis is based on principal component analysis, but with quite different 
results compared to previous psychometric studies. 
As hypothesized, control over risk is not a salient issue. Benefit seems to be the main driver in 
shaping attitudes towards the food products in the study. This is hardly a surprise for most of 
the products, but for the novel food products this finding is interesting. All three novel food 
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products (cornflakes based on GMO, beef fed with growth hormones and vitamin enriched 
convenience food) came out with almost identical factor loadings in single component 
solutions. This finding is interpreted as a result of indistinct risk perceptions that may be 
subject to a stigma effect. But apparently the stigma effect is defined by perceived lack of 
benefits rather than perceived risk. 
 
Rational but misinformed risk experts 
The fourth paper entitled ‘Institutionalized ignorance as a precondition for rational risk 
expertise’ has a more direct approach to how institutional distances affect risk perceptions. 
The study does not as such contest the rationality of risk expertise, but through a rigorous 
examination of risk reporting practices within a major food service provider the study finds 
that the majority of risks are dealt with immediately on location and hence never reported 
through the official risk reports. Therefore the paper concludes by suggesting that the experts’ 
perceptions of risk do not owe their rationality to a superior level of information on the 
subject matter, but rather to a lack of information. It simply becomes easier to maintain a 
rational position when most irregularities are dealt with locally and thus never enter into the 
reporting system. In this sense the institutional distance from risk source to risk expert 
produces a certain kind of ‘institutionalized ignorance’. 
The study was motivated by a very practical problem. The organization in question, the 
Danish division of a multinational food and service company, from time to time experienced 
some critical incidents, but their risk reporting system failed to account for any risks prior to 
these incidents. This suggested that their risk reporting system was unreliable and led to a 
research project which served a double purpose: 1) To ensure better routines for anticipating 
and managing food risks within the specific organization, and 2) to come to a better 
understanding of which factors effect information flows from risk source to risk expertise.  
The study is guided by three hypotheses: 1) Since risk taking is a way of optimizing future 
outcomes (Luhmann 1993) it is anticipated that the risk management of the organization 
should reflect a tension between concerns for profits and concerns for safety. 2) Risks that are 
perceived to be under control generally are underestimated (Starr 1969), and therefore risks 
concerning human malpractice should be underrepresented in the failure reports as they will 
be perceived to be more under control than risks stemming from system malfunctions. 3) 
Employees fear that an overrepresentation of minor risks in the risk reports affects their 
superior’s judgement of their professional competence and therefore they measure the risk of 
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getting caught in not having reported a risk up against the risk of being perceived as less 
competent and ultimately facing sanctions. 
The study employs a wide array of qualitative methods. The research design is a case study 
including a network analysis, onsite participant observations in 28 canteens, 56 semi 
structured interviews with canteen managers, chefs and canteen assistants, interview with the 
hygiene manager and results from a risk identification workshop with participants from 
executive management as well as district and canteen managers. The methodological 
approach is inspired by grounded theory and each step of the research design serves to inform 
the subsequent step in order to gradually accumulate knowledge (Strauss and Corbin 1998). 
 
The institutional attenuation of risk 
The network analysis indicates that concerns for profit are of greater importance to the 
organization than the concerns for safety. However, the fieldwork shows that what is at stake 
is more complex than a simple dichotomy of profits vs. safety. While this dichotomy can 
explain the behavior of managers who are motivated by incentives to optimize production, it 
fails to account for why lower ranking employees display similar attitudes and behavior 
towards food safety and reporting procedures. As it turned out the reluctance towards 
reporting minor risk and especially risk caused by human factors is motivated by a complex 
combination of different factors with knowledge, responsibility, conflict of loyalty and trust 
as the four most decisive factors. These factors are all imbedded in the organizational power 
structures, lines of command, and communication channels that constitute the institutional 
context of risk reporting. And they all contribute to an institutional attenuation of risk which 
is facilitated by a risk reporting procedure which to some extent is made up by fantasy 
documents, i.e. symbolic reassurances to outside audiences that risks are under control (even 
when they are not) (Clarke 1999). The overall implication of the study is that when the risk 
expert or rather risk expertise is studied in its institutional setting, as a part of a network 
dependent on efficient communication channels for corrective feedback, the rationality of risk 
expertise becomes a questionable fact. 
 
What should we expect from dialogue when trying to bridge the expert-lay divide? 
The two empirical studies of the thesis deal with risks from each side of the expert-lay divide. 
Since the identification of this divide in the early risk perception studies many studies have 
pointed to how lay people are less irrational than first assumed. Other studies have 
problematized ’the alleged simple structure of experts’ risk perception’. These studies point to 
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how experts tend to be rational only within the very narrow domain of their own expertise. 
When they evaluate risk outside this domain they tend to behave like lay people (Sjöberg 
2002b). As such the initial assumptions behind the expert-lay divide have become more 
nuanced over the past decades. The ambition behind the empirical studies of this thesis has 
been to contribute to this refinement. But the improved theoretical understanding of the 
expert-lay divide does not eliminate the practical challenges associated with it: Whenever a 
new risk is introduced to the public agenda regulators will find themselves situated between 
technological risk experts who know more about this specific risk and lay people who know 
less.   
 
From deficit to dialogue 
Introducing risk communication to bridge the gap between differences in risk perceptions and 
to create a common understanding of the problem seems to be a reasonable solution. After all, 
the Latin origin of the word communication, communicare, means to make something 
common. In  recent years risk communication has taken the form of two-way communication 
where citizens are to be engaged through a public dialogue (Löfstedt and Boholm 2009). This 
development towards involvement has to a large extent been motivated by the scarcity of 
results stemming from one-way risk communication.  Educating people about risks has been 
met with an unwillingness to be educated and similar to other professional communicators 
like PR professionals, risk communicators have been forced to reconsider the appropriateness 
of one-way communication when a common understanding is to emerge from highly complex 
and possibly politicized matters. But even though the mutuality of dialogue intuitively may 
sound appealing, the dialogical attempts of citizen engagement have not been a 
straightforward exercise.  Several empirical studies of political engagement in general and 
engagement in science and risk in particular point to the lack of political results from these 
exercises (Rowe and Frewer 2000; Petts 2004; Seifert 2006).  
 
Two opposing models of dialogue 
The fifth paper entitled ‘Risk Communication and Citizen Engagement: What to Expect from 
Dialogue’ concludes the thesis by looking into the difficulties of engaging citizens in public 
dialogue. The paper draws on one of the internationally renowned methods for citizen 
engagement, the Danish consensus conference, as an empirical case in point and highlights 
the dimension of communication symmetry between the participants of this institutionalized 
encounter between experts and lay people. The paper points to how the consensus conference 
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is successful in eliminating the geographical dimension of the institutional distance between 
experts and lay people but less successful in eliminating the normative factors pertinent to the 
scientific vis-à-vis political worldviews and expectations towards the dialogical outcome of 
this encounter. 
The paper traces the root of the problem back to a clash between two opposing conceptions of 
dialogue in Ancient Greece, namely “Plato’s Socratic interrogations in pursuit of self-
knowledge and virtue, and the Athenian deliberations for collective governance” (Linder 
2001). Whereas the former conception of dialogue claims the existence of a truth which is to 
be discovered by dialogue, the latter conception is less concerned with truth claims and sees 
dialogue as a vehicle for creating commitment between the participants. Although ideals 
about public reasoning in the era of enlightenment have blurred the distinction between these 
two opposing models of dialogue (Arendt 1961), the scientific vis-à-vis political discourses 
constitute their modern counterparts in a functionally differentiated society.  
When risks become politicized the ancient clash between the two opposing models reappear 
and deliberate techniques such as the consensus conference, despite its attempts to blur the 
presence of a knowledge deficit,  cannot disregard that while the Athenean model presumes 
communication symmetry the Socratic model favors communication asymmetry. In this sense 
the consensus conference operates through a dialogue that presumes both equality and 
inequality among participants. The paper argues that while the inequality constitutes a threat 
to the deliberative aspirations of the consensus conference, the equality among participants 
constitutes a threat to the authority of science.  
 
Dialogue as hypocrisy 
It may however be argued that there are practical solution to these threats. But the 
fundamental problem that causes these threats leads to yet another problem, namely that the 
knowledge transfer that enables participants to enter the deliberative dialogue at an adequate 
level simultaneously deprives the participants of the quality that made them relevant to the 
deliberative project in the first place: namely their representativeness. Once enlightened 
through the asymmetrical knowledge transfer from the experts the lay panelists no longer 
represent the public in general. As a consequence their political relevance disappears and this 
may be one of the reasons why deliberative projects of this kind  hardly ever have any 
external political efficacy. 
Nevertheless, dialogical approaches to risk communication are in vogue. Apart from the poor 
results from one-way communication a possible explanation for this tendency could be the 
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fact that public dialogue is a normative ideal for political governance.  But exactly because 
“participation is self-evidently a good thing in its own right, without the need for justification” 
(Stirling 2005) participatory processes of public dialogue are vulnerable to strategies of 
hypocrisy. A particularly relevant recipe for hypocrisy is offered by Brunsson (2003, 2009) 
who explains how organizations in ambiguous situations characterized by conflicting 
stakeholder demands are likely to split up the natural chain of decision making where 
communication informs decision making which eventually leads to action. By dislocating the 
element of communication public dialogue can serve as a surrogate for influence on decision 
and action. This strategy does not solve the problem but it offers some relief since members of 
a skeptical public at least have the opportunity to voice their concerns. 
 
Concluding remarks 
The expert-lay controversy is a focal point of interest throughout the thesis. The emphasis on 
institutional distances is first and foremost chosen as an analytical strategy in the empirical 
studies. Hence, it is not the ambition to present a new theoretical framework for social science 
studies of risk. Rather, the focus on institutional distances offers a different analytical 
perspective on risk that hopefully can yield new insights. Maybe future studies adopting this 
analytical strategy can provide the basis for a more elaborate theory,  while the papers 
included in this thesis only offers small and preliminary steps.  
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The constitutive element of probabilistic agency in risk. A semantic analysis 
of risk, danger, chance and hazard 
(Under review in Journal of Risk Research) 
 
Abstract: Defining central concepts with accuracy is crucial to any scientific discipline. A 
recent debate over risk definitions in this journal illustrates the far reaching consequences 
of divergent definitions. Aven and Renn (2010) define risk as a social construct while 
Rosa (2010) defines risk as an ontological fact. Both claim that their definition reflects 
the common usage of the word risk. Through a semantic analysis this paper points to a 
constitutive element of what is termed probabilistic agency in the risk concept. In this 
respect risk is distinct from danger, and because Rosa’s main argument is based on the 
apparent synonymy between risk and danger, the premises for his risk ontology are not 
valid. The paper furthermore argues that Aven and Renn’s attempt to bridge between 
epistemology and ontology is based on a distinction between a conceptual level of risk 
and its practical application which is impossible to uphold if a risk definition is to be in 
accordance with the ordinary usage of the word. The paper concludes by arguing that 
risks are only real within a subjective ontology.  
 
Key words: Risk definition; risk perception; uncertainty; probability; ontology; epistemology 
 
Introduction 
A debate between Aven and Renn (2010) and Rosa (2010) in a recent issue of Journal of Risk 
Research illustrates how difficult it is to define risk. The debate was initiated by a paper by 
Aven and Renn (2009) that analyzes the risk definition proposed by Rosa (1998; 2003). This 
definition is broadly accepted in the social sciences of risk and describes risk as “a situation or 
event where something of human value (including humans themselves) is at stake and where 
the outcome is uncertain”.  
According to Aven and Renn (2009) this definition leads to conceptual difficulties that are 
incompatible with the everyday use of risk in most applications when compared to standard 
terminology used in risk research and risk management. The problem is, according to Aven 
and Renn, that in Rosa’s definition the risk equals the event or the situation in which the event 
occurs as a state of the world. It follows from this definition that risks must be real, since 
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events are real. But according to this definition the dimension of uncertainty or likelihood is 
only associated with risk, but it does not constitute a part of the risk concept itself. Therefore 
risk as an ontological entity in Rosa’s definition is deprived the dimension of uncertainty and 
thus becomes impossible to measure. Because of this, Aven and Renn argues, the risk 
definition offered by Rosa is of little help to risk experts that need to compare and quantify 
risks. Instead Aven and Renn propose a definition that is more compatible with the practice of 
risk research and management: “Risk refers to uncertainty about and severity of the events 
and consequences (or outcomes) of an activity with respect to something that humans value” 
(Aven and Renn 2009). This definition includes the dimension of uncertainty as a quality that 
relates to both the event and its consequences.  
Both parties in the debate agree that uncertainty is a better term than probability when 
describing risk on a conceptual level. In this respect uncertainty is regarded as a more 
fundamental concept, while probability is just a practical tool for measuring or describing the 
amount of uncertainty. In Rosa’s definition the dimension of uncertainty does not violate the 
ontological status of risk, since this dimension does not constitute a part of the risk concept. 
But Aven and Renn’s definition includes uncertainty and therefore incorporates a subjective 
element. As Aven and Renn (2010) argue, “uncertainty must be someone’s uncertainty” and 
therefore the risk concept cannot be founded on ontological grounds alone; it has to include an 
epistemological dimension as well. According to Aven and Renn the concept of risk entails 
two components: the event and its consequences which are real, and an element of uncertainty 
which “is a construct of human imagination to cope with potential future outcomes that can 
become real” (Aven and Renn 2009). Therefore their risk definition constitutes “a bridge 
between an ontological state (…) and an epistemic component reflecting that we do not know 
the outcome of the future…” (Aven and Renn 2010).   
According to Rosa (2010) this “fusing of ontology and epistemology results in a fatal flaw of 
logic” and the inclusion of words like consequences and severity in Aven and Renn’s risk 
definition smuggles in a subjective and constructivist element which violates the ontological 
status of risk. 
Rosa claims that one of the strengths of his definition is that it is not only in accordance with 
the professional and scientific conceptions of risk, it also matches the common use of the 
word by lay people (Rosa 1998; 2003; 2010). Aven and Renn (2009), on the other hand, claim 
that Rosa’s definition is incompatible with the everyday usage of the risk concept, although it 
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remains unclear whether they refer to how it is used by experts, by lay people or by both – an 
ambiguity that Rosa (2010) correctly points to. Both parties argue that contrary to the general 
focus in risk research their definitions have the advantage of including voluntary risks. 
The debate reveals (at least) two major points of conflict. One is meta-theoretical and has to 
do with the ontological status of risk and uncertainty. Rosa (2010) understands both concepts 
as features of the world independent of percipient human observers whereas Aven and Renn 
(2009: 2010) see them as inseparable of human perception. Given the meta-theoretical nature 
of the conflict no empirical evidence can prove either position right or wrong. The other 
conflict, however, is empirical insofar that it is about to which degree the two risk definitions 
match the common use of the word risk, whether by experts or by lay people.  
The two points of conflict are somewhat interrelated. The ontological status of risk and its 
semantic value are not completely distinct problems. The meanings we ascribe to concepts are 
crucial to our understanding of their true nature. Therefore, a solution to the empirical 
problem of what risk really means could be an important contribution to the general debate 
over the ontological status of risk.  
The purpose of this paper is to examine the meaning of the word risk in order to improve the 
foundation for the debate over its ontological status. This examination is carried out in a 
semantic analysis of the words risk, danger, chance and hazard with a special emphasis on the 
relationship between risk and danger. This analytical strategy is chosen because Rosa (2003; 
2010) disputes the distinction between risk and danger suggested by other scholars (e.g. 
Slovic 1992; 1999; Luhmann 1993). The distinction between risk and danger is common 
within risk perceptions studies where dangers are seen as ontological realities whereas risks 
are epistemological constructs (e.g. Slovic 1999). By consulting dictionaries Rosa (2003) 
finds no basis for such a distinction in the ordinary usage of the two words, in fact they are 
apparently more or less synonymous.  
The synonymy between risk and danger is a cornerstone in Rosa’s argumentation for the 
ontological status of risk. But compared to the intellectual strength and vigor that Rosa 
demonstrates in most parts of his meta-theoretical framework it seems strange that a 
fundamental dispute over the core terminology of a scientific discipline should be solved with 
a reference to dictionary definitions. Because of the space constraints of standard print 
dictionaries their definitions rarely account for the more subtle semantic nuances of words 
(Hamilton et al. 2007) and a major deficiency of the lexicographical method is the frequent 
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circularity of definitions (Fernandez-Young and Young 2007). Furthermore according to 
Fillmore and Atkins (1994), “[a] close study of the sense differentiation of RISK in ten major 
monolingual dictionaries shows that there is no commonly held view about the semantics of 
this word”.  
Therefore a more thorough semantic analysis is called for to shed light on the actual meaning 
of risk and danger. In the debate with Aven and Renn Rosa illustrates his key points with 
some figures that depict a scenario in which a couple is placed under a boulder that may or 
may not dislodge from a ledge and hit the couple. The semantic analysis of risk, danger, 
chance and hazard in the present paper is based on different sentences that describe this 
scenario. 
 
The arguments of the paper fall in five stages. The first section addresses the controversy over 
risk definitions and highlights the distinction between realist and constructivist definitions. 
The second section discusses the relationship between risk and danger and proposes that 
Rosa’s best argument in favor of treating them as synonymous concepts is his reference to the 
ordinary usage of the words. The third section performs a comparative semantic analysis of 
risk, danger, chance and hazard. The results of this analysis reveal that risk and danger are far 
from synonymous and that the risk concept contains a significant element of agency which is 
absent in the concept of danger. The forth section discusses the implications of these results 
for Rosa’s risk ontology and argue that a risk definition should be based on probability rather 
that uncertainty. The fifth section concludes the paper by arguing that risks are real but only 
within a subjective ontology.  
 
Risk Definitions and Risk Research 
Aven and Renn (2009) as well as Rosa (2010) point to how multiple definitions of risk have 
been proposed over the past four decades of risk research. Nevertheless most definitions share 
some common features. According to Renn (1998), “[a]ll risk concepts have one element in 
common, however: the distinction between reality and possibility”.  When this distinction is 
accepted, “the term ‘risk’ is often associated with the possibility that an undesirable state of 
reality (adverse effects) may occur as a result of natural events or human activities (Renn 
1998). In this respect Renn’s observations are much in line with Drottz-Sjöberg (1991, 168) 
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who refers to Svenson and Karlsson’s (1983) conclusion that “[t]wo components are always, 
however, included in risk definitions. Firstly there must be a probabililty (likelihood or 
possibility) at hand for an event which secondly has negative consequences.”  
Despite the similarities, there are however differences between the many risk definitions. The 
fundamental distinction between risk definitions is whether risk is considered as objectively 
given or it is a social construction (Otway and Thomas 1982). This is the same conflict that 
Rosa (1998; 2003) points to in his meta-theoretical considerations: Is risk an ontological 
entity of the world independent of human perception or is risk produced by epistemological 
attempts to cope with the world?  
Although Rosa emphasizes that his risk definition is based upon an intellectual tradition that 
seeks to avoid the pitfalls of what he refers to as the practical and managerial tradition, the 
impact on practice of such meta-theoretical considerations should not be disregarded. As 
Slovic states: “Attempt to manage risk has to confront the question: ‘What is risk?’” (Slovic 
1999). This is because how risk is defined (more or less explicitly) has a significant influence 
on how risks are studied by researchers and subsequently managed by decision makers.  
The field of risk research has since its conception in the early seventies been heavily 
influenced by the psychometric paradigm (Slovic 2000, for a critical perspective see Sjöberg 
1996; 2003). The early psychometric studies assumed that risks were real (Kermisch and 
Labeau 2010) and the differences in expert and lay perceptions of risk could easily be 
ascribed to a ‘cognitive deficit’ among lay people. But later in the development of the 
psychometric paradigm Slovic (1999) as one of its founders redefined risk as a social 
construction and rejected the dichotomy between objective analysis of real risks and 
subjective risk perceptions (Slovic 1998).  
Slovic and his colleagues within the psychometric paradigm, however, do not reject the notion 
of a cognitive deficit. Early writings within the paradigm propose that for lay people risk 
assessment in term of probability estimates “may be beyond human cognitive abilities” 
(Slovic et al. 1974). And although later research points to how lay people’s “conceptualization 
of risk is much richer than that of the experts” (Slovic 1986) their risk perceptions are based 
on intuitive risk judgments as opposed to how “the technologically sophisticated analysts 
employ risk assessment” (Slovic 1987). The cognitive deficit remains, resulting in politized 
risks “when ancient instincts and our modern scientific analysis clash” (Slovic et al. 2004). 
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It is well documented that lay people express different attitudes to risks than experts do. The 
massive amount of empirical research, especially within the psychometric paradigm, speaks 
for itself. But when Slovic rejects the notion of a risk ontology the conclusion that experts 
have a better understanding of risks than lay people becomes problematical. This would 
require that risks are objectively defined. What Slovic and the psychometric paradigm seem to 
argue is that risks are not real but nevertheless that lay perceptions of risk are biased by 
cognitive inabilities. The lack of internal coherence between these propositions points to how 
the abandonment of a risk ontology has weakened the meta-theoretical foundation for the 
psychometric paradigm.  
However, to most researchers within the psychometric paradigm this inconsistency is not an 
important problem. The research produced by the psychometric paradigm is an attractive 
input for decisions makers and the strength of the paradigm is perhaps to be found in its 
appeal to practice rather than in its theoretical robustness (Sjöberg 2003). But to Rosa and the 
intellectual tradition in risk research the ontological inconsistency is a fundamental problem 
that has to be resolved. In arguing for the ontological status of risk Rosa seeks to restore the 
meta-theoretical foundation for most risk research, and it is in light of this enterprise that Rosa 
rejects the fusion between epistemology and ontology in Aven and Renn’s definition. It may 
be that the theoretical foundation is more elaborate but Aven and Renn’s definition reflects 
the same logical problem as in the psychometric paradigm: Risks are both objective and 
subjective, or with Rosa’s words “both fish and fowl” (Rosa 2010). 
 
Risk vs. Danger 
To Slovic a solution to the ontological inconsistency within the psychometric paradigm is 
found in a separation between risk and danger: “Risk does not exist ‘out there’, independent 
of our minds and cultures, waiting to be measured” (Slovic 1998). According to Slovic (1999) 
“dangers are real, [but] there is no such thing as a ‘real risk’ or ‘objective risk’”. Risk is seen 
as a social construction insofar that “human beings have invented the concept risk to help 
them understand and cope with dangers and uncertainties of life” (Slovic 1999, italics in 
original). Apparently both danger and uncertainty are ontological entities, but Slovic is rather 
unclear about this. In fact the distinction between these concepts seems not to be motivated by 
any elaborate analysis.  
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A more elaborated understanding of the relationship between risk and danger is to be found in 
a treatise about risk by the German sociologist Niklas Luhmann (Luhmann 1993). The 
distinction between risk and danger is a cornerstone in Luhmann’s analytical sociology of 
risk. In linking  the actual (which is present) to the potential (which resides in the future) 
Luhmann operates through an epistemological1 separation of risk and danger to explain how 
risks are linked to decisions that attempt to control and exploit the potentiality of the future. 
But as it is impossible to gain total control over the future through risk decisions, danger 
constitutes a residual effect which is beyond human control. Danger is then attributed to 
external factors as opposed to the risk which is attributed to the decision. According to 
Luhmann risk involves agency (control by decision making) whereas danger is something we 
tolerate as passive objects because it is beyond our control.  
When risks become a social problem it is because those affected by risk decisions are 
separated from the decision makers in what Luhmann refers to as a ‘functionally 
differentiated society’ (Luhmann 1995). What is risk to the decision maker is at the same time 
danger to those affected. In this sense it is not the risk as such that causes social problems 
(manifested in protest movements and demands for risk mitigation) but rather the distribution 
of dangers that affect those not involved in the risk decision. But according to Luhmann even 
the decision maker will be confronted with danger once the decision has been made and he 
faces the threat from an adverse outcome. As such the separation between risk and danger 
does not pertain to different individuals but rather to different points of view. 
 
In his meta-theoretical considerations Rosa (2003) addresses the way Luhmann’s systems 
theory separates risk from danger. According to Rosa the distinction made by Luhmann fails 
to take into consideration the ordinary language usage, and can only be justified as an 
instrument that serves to point out the problems of social inequalities. I shall deal with the 
first point of criticism in the following section. The second point, I will argue, does little 
justice to Luhmann’s analytical position. Surely many sociological attempts to approach risk 
rest upon value-laden assumptions about social inequalities and societal fairness (e.g. Beck 
1992; 1994; Giddens 1994; 1999), but Luhmann has explicitly refuted those sociological 
positions (Luhmann 1993: 5) and he is well aware of the pitfalls of a critical sociology – as 
well as of a positivist one (Luhmann 1994). In fact, the systems theory proposed by Luhmann 
rejects the metaphysical assumptions about social fairness that is predominant in the critical 
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tradition of sociology. Therefore it is hard to understand how Rosa comes to the conclusion 
that Luhmann’s distinction is motivated by problems of social inequalities.  
 
In his debate with Aven and Renn Rosa (2010) once again argues against a distinction 
between risk and danger. And again the apparent synonymy between the words plays a critical 
role in his argumentation. According to Rosa the distinction poses three problems: 1) it would 
result in a semantic discontinuity as risk in many situations should be re-labeled as danger 
(e.g. perception of danger), 2) it would send us into a definitional circularity (risk is defined as 
danger and vice versa), and 3) it would imply a rejection of the analytic separation of 
ontology and epistemology. 
The first problem about semantic discontinuity is not really a problem. The semantic 
continuity of the core terminology in risk research is based upon tradition and not logical 
consistency. A central concept such as ‘risk perception’ is an illustrative example of this. 
Within the risk perception studies most scholars claim that risk is a construction produced by 
subjects. As Sjöberg (2000) points out, this subjective position renders the term risk 
perception rather absurd. Perception is the immediate sensorial information processing based 
on impressions from an external world. It follows from this that if risk is a subjective 
construct (i.e. produced by human cognition) it cannot be perceived. But for pragmatic 
reasons we have to accept the term as it “seems to be here to stay, in spite of its basically 
confusing meaning” (Sjöberg 2000). In other words: We can for practical reasons decide to 
sustain the core terminology despite of its logical inconsistency. 
It is difficult to understand how Rosa arrives at the third problem about how a separation of 
risk and danger necessary leads to a rejection of the analytic separation of ontology and 
epistemology. Aven and Renn (2009) argue that a separation is necessary because risk is 
constructed (i.e. an epistemological concept) whereas danger is real (as an ontological fact). 
Their separation of risk and danger is based on (and would be absolutely pointless without) an 
analytical separation of ontology and epistemology.  
So it seems that the most robust argument Rosa has against a distinction between risk and 
danger is to be found in the second problem: That risk and danger are synonymous. Therefore 
a separation of risk and danger would violate the common usage of the two words. Rosa refers 
to how dictionaries such as the Oxford English and Random House define risk and danger in 
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terms of each other. This is true, but it is equally true that dictionaries rarely capture the entire 
semantic value of a word. Therefore the following section seeks to reveal the different 
meanings of risk and danger through a more thorough semantic analysis. In continuation of 
the link between risk and decision proposed by Luhmann the analysis will emphasize the 
aspects of control and agency.  
 
A semantic Analysis of Risk, Danger, Chance and Hazard 
The following section analyzes the semantic value of risk, danger, chance and hazard in six 
different sentences that describe a scenario in which a couple is placed under a boulder that 
may or may not dislodge from a ledge and hit the couple.  
The words risk, danger, chance and hazard have been chosen because to various degrees they 
are all suitable for describing scenarios where the outcome is uncertain. The words risk, 
danger, and hazard are familiar terms in risk research while chance tends to be an outsider. 
The inclusion of chance in the analysis is motivated by its capacity to account for the 
uncertainty of an outcome in neutral terms. The respective definitions of the words may differ 
in scientific and technical vocabularies, but this analysis is based on the contemporary 
acceptable usage of the English language. The semantic distinctions may be different in other 
languages and historical epochs. Sentences that are grammatically or semantically 
unacceptable are marked with an asterisk (*) while sentences that are rare or unusual are 
marked with a question mark (?).  
 
Example 1: The couple placed under the boulder is exposed to (a) risk 
This sentence refers to risk as something we can be exposed to as passive targets and the two 
words risk and danger are virtually but not completely synonymous. By using the phrase 
‘exposed to’ the sentence contains a semantic cue indicating that the subject (i.e. the couple) 
has no control over the situation. Because of this risk and danger can be used interchangeably. 
Both sentences make sense and there is no change in the meaning of them. 
The couple can be ‘exposed to risk’ or ‘exposed to danger’ as a more general condition 
without a specific object. In this case the two sentences refer more broadly to the situation as 
a coincidental configuration between the subject and the object2. The situation is marked by 
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uncertainty and this uncertainty is framed explicitly as a negative condition. But the couple 
can also be ‘exposed to a risk’ or ‘exposed to a danger’ where the object is defined and in this 
case it is plausible to infer that the exposure stems from the specific object rather than from 
the situation. 
In the first case the same coincidental configuration is present in the sentence ‘exposed to 
chance’. Again the situation is marked by uncertainty, but the uncertainty is framed in more 
neutral terms. The problem seems to be not so much the potentially negative outcome from 
the object, but rather the uncertainty of the situation: They cannot know what will happen. 
This becomes even more evident if we should propose a sentence like ‘exposed to a chance’, 
referring to chance as a more specific object. This sentence is not very common and it seems 
that when we use the word chance, we have a preference for referring to the uncertainty of a 
situation rather than to the threat from a specific object. 
The threat from an object is present in the sentences ‘exposed to a risk’ and ‘exposed to a 
danger’ and likewise in the sentence ‘exposed to a hazard’. But where both risk and danger 
are applicable when referring to the situation as well as when referring to the object, hazard is 
usually only applicable as a characteristic of the object. We rarely find sentences such as 
‘exposed to hazard’. 
To sum up: The subject in this sentence is a passive target of exposure and has no agency. 
Agency is more or less explicitly ascribed to the object (exposed to a risk vs. exposed to risk). 
In this case risk and danger are completely synonymous. Whilst chance refers to the 
uncertainty of the situation and hazard to the threat from a given object, both risk and danger 
are perfectly applicable for both purposes.  
 
Example 2: There is a risk that the boulder will hit the couple   
In this sentence the couple is yet again a passive target, but the agency is explicitly defined as 
a quality of the object. The risk refers to a general condition under which the boulder might 
hit the couple. Unlike example 1 the coincidental configuration (the risk) and the object (the 
risk source or hazard) is clearly separated. The risk as a general condition or situation 
involves no agency, but the potentiality of the situation points to the possibility that the object 
may or may not act. Because of this the semantic value of the words risk, danger, chance and 
hazard changes slightly. All sentences make sense, but in the common use of language there is 
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a preference for using the word risk rather than danger or hazard in a sentence like this. If we 
were to replace the word risk, chance would in this case be a better substitute than danger or 
hazard; despite its lack of negative connotations. An explanation for this, as well as for the 
preference for risk over danger, could be the element of uncertainty which has a stronger 
semantic presence in risk and chance than in danger and hazard.3  
 
Example 3: The couple takes a risk by placing themselves under the boulder 
In this sentence the couple is no longer a passive target. They assume agency as they actively 
take a risk.  They can take a risk or take a chance, and the preference for one over the other 
depends on the negative vis-à-vis neutral or positive framing of the situation. But they cannot 
take a danger or take a hazard. In this sentence the presence of agency associated with the 
subject excludes danger and hazard as valid substitutes for risk. This indicates that risk is 
semantically distinct from danger when agency is ascribed to the subject as the deliberate act 
of creating a coincidental configuration between the subject and the object. Example 1 and 2 
point to risk and chance as concepts which are more strongly related to uncertainty than 
danger and hazard are. This indicates that the deliberative act of creating the coincidental 
configuration between the subject and the object involves the mastery of or control over 
uncertainty. Contrary to example 1 the couple is to some degree in control of the situation, 
and as it is the situation (and not the object) which is marked by uncertainty, the control 
involves some mastery of uncertainty. 
 
Example 4: The couple placed under the boulder is in a risky situation 
So far we have analyzed risk, danger, chance and hazard as nouns. If we look at the words as 
adjectives it becomes evident that the element of uncertainty is clearly related to the situation 
and not the object (i.e. the boulder as a risk source or hazard). In this example all sentences 
make sense although the meaning might differ slightly. For instance the word chancy (and in 
this specific case also hazardous which would be more appropriate – see note 4) indicates that 
uncertainty is the main issue whereas the word dangerous more specifically points to the 
negative characteristics of the potential outcome or consequences. Whether we have a 
preference for risk or danger is contingent upon factors related to the specific situation (see 
example 5). In the present example we have a preference for using danger as an adequate 
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description of the situation. This is because there is a preference for describing the object (or 
the threat), which is a constitutional part of the situation, as dangerous and not risky.  
 
Example 5: *The boulder is risky 
The boulder in this sentence is neither risky, nor chancy nor hazardous. The boulder is 
dangerous, and this quality of the object is independent of any attempt to control the situation. 
But the boulder is not dangerous because of its position as the object (the risk source or 
hazard). Other objects such as advanced financial products are risky and not dangerous. 
Nanotechnology is usually described as risky rather than dangerous. Likewise the situations 
that surround these objects (financial markets and nanoscience) are rarely described as 
dangerous. They are risky. Similar to the analysis of risk, danger, chance and hazard as nouns, 
what seems to be the main characteristic that distinguishes risk from danger is the coexistence 
of agency and uncertainty, unified in act of controlling uncertainty. 
 
Example 6: The couple risk getting hit by the boulder 
This act of controlling uncertainty is very obvious when we turn to look at risk, danger, 
chance and hazard as verbs. In some occasions it is possible to use hazard and chance as verbs 
which describe the act of putting something at stake. The idiomatic expression ‘to hazard 
one’s life’ is an example of this, and while the sentence ‘The couple hazard getting hit by the 
boulder’ sounds odd a sentence like ‘The couple hazard their lives by staying under the 
boulder’ would be common.  However, generally there is a strong preference for using the 
word risk. And what is mostly important, it is absolutely impossible to use the word danger as 
a verb. Therefore the most common sentence in this example would be: The couple risk 
getting hit by the boulder. Again the coexistence of agency and uncertainty can account for 
this. 
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Risk vs. danger as a noun Risk vs. danger as an adjective 
 
Risk vs. danger as a verb 
 
 
Example 1: 
The couple placed under the 
boulder is exposed to (a) risk 
 
The couple placed under the 
boulder is exposed to (a) danger 
 
(?)The couple placed under the 
boulder is exposed to (a) chance 
 
?The couple placed under the 
boulder is exposed to (a) hazard 
 
 
Example 2: 
There is a risk that the boulder 
will hit the couple   
 
There is a danger that the 
boulder will hit the couple 
 
There is a chance that the 
boulder will hit the couple 
 
There is a hazard that the 
boulder will hit the couple 
 
 
Example 3: 
The couple takes a risk by 
placing themselves under the 
boulder 
 
*The couple takes a danger by 
placing themselves under the 
boulder 
 
The couple takes a chance by 
placing themselves under the 
boulder 
 
*The couple takes a hazard by 
placing themselves under the 
boulder 
 
 
Example 4: 
The couple placed under the boulder is 
in a risky situation 
 
The couple placed under the boulder is 
in a dangerous situation 
 
?The couple placed under the boulder 
is in a chancy situation 
 
The couple placed under the boulder is 
in a hazardous situation 
 
 
Example 5: 
*The boulder is risky 
 
The boulder is dangerous 
 
*The boulder is chancy 
 
*The boulder is hazardous 
 
 
 
 
Example 6: 
The couple risk getting hit by the 
boulder 
 
*The couple danger getting hit by 
the boulder 
 
?The couple chance getting hit by 
the boulder 
 
?The couple hazard getting hit by 
the boulder 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. Semantic variations of risk, danger, chance and hazard.  
 
This is of course not a complete analysis of all the variances of the words risk, danger, chance 
and hazard. For instance it could be argued that it is possible to use the word danger as a verb 
in the form of ‘endanger’. This is true but it would not alter the semantic elements of control 
and agency associated with risk and danger. To endanger other people may involve a risk 
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decision (and hence control), but the affected party has no control over the situation. The 
word endanger therefore refers to the point of view of the affected party. If a bus driver 
decides to ignore a red light, he takes a risk but the passengers are endangered if an accident is 
close to occur or has occurred as a result of this decision. Likewise it would be possible to 
construct sentences such as ‘I exposed myself to a risk’ or ‘he exposes himself to a danger’ 
which indicate that exposure is not necessarily correlated with lack of control. But in such 
phrases there is usually an element of dissociation or condemnation which indicate that the 
person in question were not aware of the possible consequences. This dissociation can either 
be temporal as in the first phrase or due to the external position of a more knowledgeable 
observer as in the second phrase. 
The main point is that a semantic analysis reveals that although there is a large semantic 
overlap between risk and danger, the former is more closely related to the subject and the 
attempts to control the uncertainty of a situation whereas the latter is more related to the 
object and the severity of its potential impact. In this respect the analysis provides some 
empirical motivation for Luhmann’s distinction between risk as a concept closely associated 
with control and decision making and danger as a concept associated with tolerance of 
consequences. The semantic differences and overlaps are illustrated in model 1.  
 
 
Model 1. The semantics of risk and danger. 
 
The semantic analysis shows that the distinction between risk and danger in most risk 
perception research is in accordance with the semantic value of the two words. Risk and 
danger are, despite some semantic overlap, semantically distinct concepts.  But as the model 
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shows it is possible, like Rosa does, to argue that risk and danger are synonyms. But in doing 
so one would have to disregard the full semantic value of the two words. This is illustrated in 
the grey toned part of the model which accounts for the semantic spectrum where risk and 
danger can be used interchangeably without altering the semantics.  
 
Discussion 
The previous analysis has shown that the apparent synonymy between risk and danger that 
Rosa (2003) found in dictionaries can only account for a very narrow understanding of the 
words.4 Risk and danger are only synonymous when subjects are passive targets of risk 
exposure. In those cases where subjects actively engage in risk taking the common usage of 
risk and danger turns out have quite different meanings.  
But this does not necessarily disqualify Rosa’s risk definition; we can accept Rosa’s definition 
as well as the argument in favor of a risk ontology, although it is based on a very narrow 
understanding of risk and danger. But Rosa furthermore argues that his risk definition can 
account for voluntary risks as well as for those that are involuntarily imposed on humans (or 
what they value).  
It is Rosa’s ambition that his risk definition should cover voluntary risks and Rosa is not the 
only scholar to point to the striking negligence of voluntary risks in risk research. Adams 
(1995: 16) advocates that “the starting point of any theory of risk must be that everyone 
willingly takes risks”. But as he concludes, this is far from the starting point of most of the 
literature on risk. In fact, most risk researchers ignore the role of risk taking. Agency in the 
technical literature on risk is clearly associated with the risk source and humans are defined as 
objects of exposure (see Christensen et al. 2003 for an overview of the technical risk 
terminology). Likewise in the social sciences where ”the problem of risk seeking behavior…is 
exceptional, and requires a very different discussion. Normally risks are disliked” (Sjöberg 
1999).  
Compared to the total semantic value of the risk concept most risk perception studies are 
founded on a very narrow understanding of risk. In fact, all elements of subjective agency are 
absent. In this respect Rosa’s risk definition corresponds to the general practice in risk 
perception research, which is probably why his definition has become so popular. So despite 
its intentions Rosa’s risk definition can only account for involuntary risks, ie. the type of risks 
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that subjects are passively exposed to. If voluntary risks (i.e. the acts of risk taking) are to be 
included in Rosa’s definition a more broad understanding risk is required and in this case risk 
and danger are not synonymous. But then the argumentation in favor of a risk ontology falls 
apart; not just because risk and danger can no longer be considered as synonymous, but most 
importantly because a subjective dimension has entered into the risk concept. The problem 
with Rosa’s argumentation is that on the one hand he states that risk and danger are the same, 
and on the other that his risk definition includes voluntary risks (which implies that risk and 
danger are not the same, if his definition is to be in accordance with the everyday usage of the 
word).  
So Aven and Renn do have a point when they insist that the concept of risk has a subjective 
dimension. But a question remains to be answered: is there an objective dimension as well? 
And if so: how are these dimensions integrated in the concept of risk? Aven and Renn 
propose that the risk concept is defined by two components: the event and its consequences 
which exist objectively, and uncertainty which exist inter-subjectively in the sense that future 
events and consequences are unknown.  
But if we return to the fundamental distinction between possibility and reality in risk 
definitions (Renn 1998), it becomes evident that the only events that meaningfully can be 
categorized within an ontological state of the world are those that have happened or actualized 
a possible state of being. The events and consequences that meaningfully can be included in a 
risk definition, however, are those that have not yet occurred, i.e. the “potential future 
outcomes that can become real” (Aven and Renn 2009). And since the mere possibility of 
being (as the not yet actualization of an event) does not qualify for inclusion into a state of the 
world, the events and consequences in the risk concept cannot be regarded as ontological 
facts. The prevailing realist perspective that sustain a clear distinction between reality and 
possibility may be challenged by quantum physics where possibilities are assumed to be real 
and hence on the same ontological levels as their actualization, and in philosophy we find 
similar thoughts, recently in model realism theories of possible worlds. But since these 
theories neglect the distinction between reality (as actualization) and possibility, they are 
incompatible with the general conception of risk. 
Both Rosa and Aven/Renn make a clear distinction between risk as a concept and its practical 
application. On the conceptual level both parties prefer uncertainty rather than probability as a 
component in their risk definition because the former is considered to be a more fundamental 
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concept. But uncertainty, whether it is conceived to be objective (Rosa 2010) or inter-
subjective (Aven and Renn 2009), is a condition which does not necessarily involve any 
agency; there are innumerous uncertainties we for many reasons chose to ignore. Subjective 
probability on the other hand is a more distinct concept which is characterized by its ability to 
transform uncertainty into something manageable. And as we have seen in the analysis, the 
element of subjective agency associated with controlling uncertainty accounts for the majority 
of the semantic value of the risk concept.  
That agency is a constitutive element in the risk concept is confirmed by empirical results 
from corpus linguistics (Hamilton, Adolphs and Nerlick 2007). They confirm that together 
with bad outcomes, such as loss of a valuable asset, the semantic core of the word risk 
emphasizes actions and agents. Furthermore data suggests that risk “represents something 
computable, the computation involving the negative value of the Harm, the positive value of 
the intended Gain, and the probabilities associated with each” (Fillmore and Atkins 1992). It 
seems that probability as a measurement of uncertainty is not confined to technical risk 
assessment; probability is semantically affiliated with the risk concept in the everyday usage 
of language. This semantic connection between risk and probability weakens the argument of 
Aven and Renn (2009) that a risk definition should include uncertainty and not probability – 
at least if it is to be in accordance with the everyday usage of language.  
 Aven and Renn acknowledge that probability is a useful tool for measuring risks, but to them 
the practice of measurement should be separated from the conceptual level of risk. Their main 
argument is that probability cannot account for all uncertainties. As Aven (2010) argue, 
important uncertainties may be hidden within probabilities. But this understanding of 
probability fails to acknowledge the element of agency. As de Finetti (1970) argues 
probability is an indispensable instrument for reasoning and behaving under uncertainty, 
hence probability not only measures uncertainty; it transforms uncertainty.  
This act of transformation can be termed probabilistic agency. It is an act that enables us to 
make decisions as if there were no uncertainty. While uncertainty generally is defined as lack 
of information (Klir 2006), probability calculations provide the missing information and thus 
enable us to make rational decisions. Luhmann (1995) points to this important feature about 
both risk and probabilistic calculation when he observes that “[b]oth concepts appear to be 
able to guarantee that even when things go wrong, one can have acted correctly”.  
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While it is obvious that probability is different from confirmed knowledge (or truth), the point 
being made is that the transformation of uncertainty into probability enables us to deal with 
uncertainty as if we had knowledge. For the point being made it is of no concern that the 
actual probability calculations being made may be biased by various heuristics (see e.g. 
Kahneman and Tversky 1972; Tversky and Kahneman 1974; Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky 
1982). The point is that uncertainty as non-information is transformed into probability which 
serves as information. Since the 1960’ies the unique connection between probability and 
uncertainty has been challenged by theories such fuzzy logic, evidence theory and possibility 
theory (Klir and Wierman 1999), but this challenge does not affect this basic function of 
transforming non-information into information.  
The presence of probabilistic agency identified in the semantic analysis of the risk concept 
refers to this act of transforming non-information into information which is more than just a 
practice of measuring uncertainty. Because of this transformation probability can serve as 
“our guide of life” (Good 1959) while uncertainty cannot. And since the element of 
probabilistic agency is semantically present in the risk concept it is impossible to distinguish 
between the conceptual level of risk and its application in risk assessment. The concept of risk 
cannot be separated from its application – at least if it is to be in accordance with the ordinary 
usage of the word. In this respect we should not consider risk to be, what Searle (1995) terms 
a brute fact but rather an institutional fact which is defined by its social function. 
 
Concluding Remarks: A last comment on the ontology of risk 
Both Aven/Renn and Rosa treat the event in their risk definitions as if it was an actual and not 
just potential event.  In this respect it is important to make a clear distinction between the 
threat from an object and the event that occurs if and when that threat is transformed into an 
event. The threat is not an objective given in the same sense as the event since it cannot be 
evaluated without any reference to a subject which is threatened. A threat is what Searle terms 
a performative (Searle 1969) and as such its very existence is dependent upon its 
perlocutionary effect. In other words: the target of a threat must recognize that threat if it is to 
be considered a threat. As Aven and Renn (2010) explain this recognition can occur by proxy 
by a more knowledgeable outside observer, but the threat is dependent upon recognition in 
order to exist. The link between the threat and the event is defined by time and they cannot 
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exist simultaneously; once the threat is transformed into an event it loses its perlocutionary 
effect and ceases to be a threat.  
The same holds true for the concept of risk; once the event has occurred, the risk is absent. It 
has so to speak exploited the element of potentiality which is a constitutional element of the 
risk concept. Both threat and risk are concepts which 
involve and are dependent upon subjective perceptions of reality. But as Aven and Renn 
(2010) argue, “this does not mean that risk assessments are arbitrary or void of any objective 
knowledge”. We do have objective knowledge about the world and therefore the subjective 
element in the risk concept should not lead to a radical social constructivist definition of risk. 
I agree with Rosa (2003) that the extreme positions of both objectivist and subjectivist views 
of risk are poor descriptions of reality. In a similar vein I appreciate Aven and Renn’s efforts 
to find a compromise, although I agree with Rosa that the result is logically inconsistent. I 
hold that risk must be subjectively defined, but that does not necessarily imply “a naïve social 
constructivist view in which risk is treated as a subjective narrative that cannot be evaluated 
according to criteria of truth or appropriateness.”  The threat from a given object, whether this 
threat is produced by a risk decision or the risk decision is a reaction to a recognized threat, 
has to be founded in an ontological reality. In returning to the boulder example, the threat 
from the boulder is dependent upon the existence of boulders as well as it is dependent upon a 
subjective recognition. The boulder is dangerous and this danger is real independently of any 
human observer. Since the threat is dependent upon danger it must somehow fit into an 
objective reality although it belongs to a subjective reality. 
Searle (1995) argues that the social reality of institutional facts fits into a larger ontology of 
objective fact but that the social reality itself belongs to a different ontology. This ontology 
consists of facts that cannot be separated from their subjective perception, usage and function. 
In contrast to the objective ontology in which Rosa attempts to categorize risk, the subjective 
ontology “exists only in relation to the intentionality of agents” (Searle 1995, 10). I hold that 
risk belongs to this subjective ontology. Thus risks are real, but only insofar that there is a 
social reality in which subjects engage in risk taking. 
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Notes 
1. Luhmann’s systems theory is basically a theory of how observers observe, hence a theory that focuses on 
epistemology. Luhmann does not reject the existence of a world independent of human observation, but in his 
epistemological constructivism a world independent of human observation is cognitively inaccessible and 
therefore he does not engage his theory in speculation about this world. 
2. What is referred to as the object is generally termed hazard or risks source. This may cause some confusion as 
the technical risk literature defines objects as the humans who are exposed to risk.  At this point we should not 
enter in a discussion of whether these terms are appropriate or not. It suffices to say that in this specific case the 
object is the boulder. 
3. The semantic presence of uncertainty in hazard is somewhat ambiguous. When hazard is defined as an object it 
is more or less synonymous with danger. But when hazard is used in a less concrete context the element of 
uncertainty, or more precisely randomness, is predominant. 
4. In fact, if we should accept dictionary definitions, Rosa’s own definition of risk would face some problems. If 
we for instance look up the word ‘stake’ in the Oxford English Dictionary (OED) (1989) the following definition 
is offered: “That which is placed at hazard”. As Rosa correctly point to, most dictionaries define concepts such 
as risk, danger, peril and hazard in terms of each other and following the definitions in OED we could add 
‘stake’ to that category.  If we look up the idiom ‘at stake’ in the Random House Compact Unabridged 
Dictionary (Random House 1996) a similar definition emerges: ‘at stake’ means “in danger (of being lost)” or 
“to risk (something), as upon the result of a game or the occurrence or outcome of any uncertain even”. More 
superficial online dictionaries would simply refer to synonyms such as ‘at risk’. If we accept the definitions by 
dictionaries as adequate descriptions of the meaning of words, we could easily use ‘at risk’ as a valid substitute 
for ‘at stake’. In this case Rosa defines risk as “a situation or event where something of human value (including 
humans themselves) is ‘at risk’ and where the outcome is uncertain”. Surely Rosa would be dissatisfied with this 
definition as it represents a tautology, which he so enthusiastically disputed in his defense of a unification of risk 
and danger (Rosa 2003). Confronted with this apparent tautology Rosa would probably point to the fact that 
dictionaries do not account for the many situations where “at stake” means something different from “at risk”. 
Just as this paper has pointed to how “risk” means something different from “danger” depending on the situation 
in which we use the words. 
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Abstract: Through a principal component analysis the present study explores how consumers 
perceive food risk by asking respondents of an online survey (n=732) to assess the risks of 
concrete food products. The study confirms the hypothesis that control over risk is not a 
salient issue for consumer decisions about concrete products. The study finds that consumers 
assess food products in terms of benefits rather than in terms of risks. This is also the case for 
controversial novel food products such as genetically modified food. Three very different 
novel food products exhibited almost identical single component solutions in the analysis. 
This result is interpreted as the consequence of a stigma effect. This effect is apparently 
produced by lack of perceived benefit and not by perceived risk. The analysis furthermore 
suggests that organic food benefit from a halo effect and that a cognitive imprint remains for 
products which have been subject to food scandals, even if consumers have readopted their 
previous purchase behavior.  
 
KEY WORDS: Food risks; risk perceptions; decision; control; novel food. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
During the past decades society has witnessed a number of food scares such as BSE and avian 
bird flu.(1,2)  Furthermore, new food risk topics related to novel foods and biotechnology such 
as GMO have added to the public concerns over food risks.(3,4,5) Moreover, society is 
currently struggling with the massive consequences of lifestyle risks related to obesity,(6) 
although consumers paradoxically rate these risks as significantly lower than technological 
risk such as GMO.(7,8) On top of that the growing concern about climate changes has led to 
significant recent public concern and media attention to the environmental impacts of food 
miles and greenouse gas emissions in food production.(9)The sum of all these risks and the 
resulting societal concern are a politicization of food risks similar to that of risks related to 
new technologies. As a result of this development, studies of food risk perceptions have 
increased since the 1990s.(10) 
Although the politicization of food risks in some respect makes them comparable to 
traditional technological risks, which have been the preferred objects of investigation in risk 
perception studies,(1) there may be good reasons to believe that food risks are distinct from 
other risks: Firstly, since food is vital to survival, avoidance is not an option.(11,12) Secondly, 
our risk decisions concerning food consumption become intertwined with completely 
different logics concerning food quality, taste and other preferences.(13) Especially the 
perceived benefit in terms of anticipated enjoyment is salient in consumer decisions, often at 
the expense of perceived health benefits.(14,15) Thus, there are strong arguments in favor of 
developing a more specific school of thought for food risks.(1) 
 
1.2. Risk regulation vs. purchase decision 
Most studies of food risk perception can be divided into three categories: 1) General studies of 
the relationship between risk items and risk characteristics,(16,17,18,19,20)  2) studies that focus 
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on particular food-related hazards such as GMO,(3,4,21,22) and 3) studies that look into specific 
food scares such as BSE.(23,24) 
Sparks and Shepherd(16) were the first to apply the psychometric approach to food risks, and 
their results more or less replicated the results obtained in the previous psychometric studies, 
which  have been conducted over a broad range of hazards: The two factors dread/severity 
and knowledge explained 78% of the variance in their study. Subsequent studies have led to 
similar results.(17,19,20) However, the psychometric studies have been criticized for neglecting 
individual differences in risk perception,(25) and a study by Siegrist, Keller and Kiers shows 
that there are significant differences in lay people’s perceptions of food risks.(18) Yet other 
studies suggest that people view food risks as dissimilar and therefore assess different risk 
items according to different risk characteristics.(26,27)  
Especially the methodological aspect of whether risk perception studies present specific or 
general risk items to the respondents seems to play an important role in their assessment of 
these risks.(16,28,29) Sparks and Shepherd suggested that “there is unlikely to be a simple 
evaluative relationship between general and specific hazards” and note that the naming of 
certain hazards may evoke negative connotations that affect the assessment of these 
hazards.(16) Sparks and Shepherd modified the risk characteristics advanced in previous 
psychometric studies and selected their risk items on the basis of media coverage. Fife-Schaw 
and Rowe used focus groups to select risk characteristics which reflect the most salient public 
concerns. Their selection of risk items was based on voiced concerns in the focus groups as 
well as on previous studies.(17) The selected risk items in both studies, however, did not 
represent a homogenous level of specificity. This problem, which the authors are aware of, 
may have some important consequences for the element of control in the risk assessments: 
While some risk items are subject to direct personal control and may be chosen because of 
specific preferences (e.g. artificial sweeteners), other risk items are tolerated rather than 
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chosen, and these risk items can only be controlled indirectly through political regulation (e.g. 
pesticide residues). In assessing the methodological approaches to studying food risk 
perceptions Frewer and colleagues point to this crucial distinction; that “[f]ood safety is seen 
to be as much a societal issue as one which is under the control of the individual, implicating 
credibility and trust in risk regulators as well as individual choice over risk exposures.”(11)  
 
1.3. Research Aim and Rationale of the Present Study 
The aim of this study is to come to a better understanding of how consumers perceive the risk 
they are confronted with in a purchase situation. Some studies point to how consumers 
perceive food risks in purchase situations very differently from how they perceive the more 
specific risk items chosen in many risk perception studies.(11, 30) In marketing research risk is 
defined in terms of product performance as well as product safety,(31) and an explanation for 
the more positive evaluation of food risks in purchase situations could be that the expected 
benefit associated with a concrete product has an effect on how consumers assess the specific 
risk items pertinent to that product. Chicken meat is a well-known source for salmonella 
contamination, but at the same time it is lean and nutritious. Many studies find that perceived 
benefit is inversely correlated with perceived risk,(32) but this inverse correlation of 
risk/benefit is not captured in studies that confront respondents with specific risk items such 
as salmonella. Thus, in the present study it was decided to include concrete products rather 
than specific risk items. In a purchase situation consumers have to decide whether or not to 
purchase a concrete product, and risks and benefits are weighed up against one another. The 
consequences of exposing oneself to a specific hazard or risk item, however, is not irrelevant 
as to various degrees it will play a role in the purchase decision. But in the end the purchase 
decision is about a product and not about a specific risk item. 
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However, the present study does not neglect the effect various food scandals have had on trust 
in industry and regulators,(33) and the importance of trust, e.g  in the acceptability of GM 
technology in food.(34) Nor does it suggest that these food scares and specific risk items are 
irrelevant to consumers’ purchase decisions. Many studies suggest that they are. But in 
continuation of the innumerous studies since Starr’s(35) distinction between voluntary and 
involuntary risks, this study assumes that consumers’ risk perceptions, and especially their 
risk tolerance, will be different when confronted with concrete products instead of specific 
risk items. The rationale behind this assumption is that while consumers actively make 
choices about food products, they often find themselves in a situation where the choices 
concerning specific risk items have been made by others.  
 
1.3. Hypotheses 
The study is focus through two hypotheses. The first hypothesis relates to the element of 
personal control in consumer decisions on a more general level. It has the character of a 
working hypothesis, since it does not specify any distinct outcome. The second hypothesis is 
more distinct and suggests that the respondents will assess the food products included in the 
survey according to some basic criteria.  
 
H1: Because the respondents are asked to rate the risks of concrete products, their risk 
assessments will be influenced by a sense of personal control. Thus, it is hypothesized that 
control will be a less salient concern compared to studies that ask respondents to rate specific 
risk items. 
 
Since Starr’s distinction between voluntary and involuntary risks(35) many psychometric 
studies have shown how the element of control contributes to the dread factor in lay 
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perceptions of risk.(36) The element of control seems to be a main driver in shaping public risk 
perceptions of food related hazards as well.(16,17) Lack of trust in regulation contributes to the 
general impression held by the public that man-made hazards, such as BSE and potential 
hazards from biotechnology, are out of control.(37) As a consequence these risks are rated as 
relatively high. Conversely, the sense of personal control related to life style risks and 
bacterial contamination in domestic household practice leads to low risk assessments and risk 
neglecting behavior.(7,38) The combination of perceived control and low risk assessments can 
be explained as a result of optimistic bias,(39) which has also been a recurring theme in the 
literature about perception of food risks.(40,16)  
The present study asks people to rate the risks of concrete products, which in most cases form 
part of their everyday food consumption. Therefore it is assumed that respondents in general 
will perceive the risks as under their personal control. Thus, the element of control arguably 
should manifest itself differently as compared to studies where respondent are asked to rate 
specific risk items, which for a large part is not under their personal control.  
 
H2: The risks from the presented food products will be assessed according to different 
criteria, and some of these differences will manifest themselves in a continuum from products 
with a halo effect (positive ratings) to products with a stigma effect (negative ratings). 
 
Similar to controversial technologies such as nuclear power, certain products may become 
stigmatized.(41) This can happen in a shorter period of time during a food scare such as 
BSE,(24) or it can become more or less permanent as in the case of genetically modified 
food.(42) The effects of stigma direct attention away from possible benefits and result in 
avoidance of the affected object.(41)  
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Other products profit from an opposite effect. As an element in consumers’ risk reduction 
strategies they can choose to rely on certain brands or labels across brands and product 
categories,  e.g. those  that  guarantee sustainability with respect to the production chain from 
earth to table.(31) Like stigma the halo effect implies that risks and benefits are assessed 
according to one (or a few) salient lay belief(s). In this case the positive associations pertinent 
to the specific label would have a spillover effect on the general evaluation of the product. A 
good example is food labeled as ‘organic’ which often is perceived to be safer, more 
nutritious and of better quality than conventional food.(43)  
Both stigma and halo effects can be viewed as the results of risk and complexity reduction 
strategies applied by consumers that during their grocery shopping have to make choices 
about a large number of products in a very short period of time. Thus, it is hypothesized that 
novel food items will be subject to a stigma effect and conversely that organic and fair-trade 
labeled food items will profit from a halo effect. 
 
2. PRE-STUDY: SELECTING FOOD RISK ITEMS AND RISK CHARACTERISTICS 
A pre-study was set up in order to identify salient risk characteristics. 13 participants, which 
represented a fairly heterogeneous group with respect to socio-demographic traits, were 
selected through snowball-sampling. (44) The participants were divided into two groups, and 
two focus groups with an average length of 45 minutes were conducted. 
The aim of this pre-study was not to obtain specific risk assessments of concrete products, but 
confronting the participants with concrete every day food products served as a vehicle for 
discussions that expressed which risk characteristics were most salient to the participants.  
The participants were presented with the task of rating the risk of 17 food products up against 
each other. The products selected represented a wide range of food items included in the 
average consumer’s grocery shopping. At this point no controversial products such as 
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genetically modified food were included, as it was judged that such products would lead to 
extreme but tacit evaluations. The participants were instructed to not just rate the risks 
associated with the products, but most importantly to explain the rationale behind their 
ratings. The assumption behind this method was that the participants’ arguments and 
discussions would expose some general parameters on which they evaluate risks concerning 
their food consumption. 
The discussions that followed were transcribed and coded. The initial codes were compared 
and arranged into fewer and more abstract categories. At the most abstract level three major 
categories appeared: 1) concern for self, 2) concern for society, and 3) concern for nature. 
This level of abstraction did not, however, match actual words used by the participants, and 
also the participants appeared to rate the risks of different products on different parameters. 
Therefore it was decided to select the risk characteristics on a lower level of abstraction. This 
resulted in seven characteristics which together with a question regarding the overall risk and 
benefit were included in the survey (see table I). Data from the focus groups showed that the 
participants rated the risks according to a tradeoff strategy where risks and benefits were 
compared across different products. Therefore many of the ‘risk characteristics’ include both 
a positive and a negative dimension (a-e). Overall risk and benefit were included as risk 
characteristics in order to see if there would be any pattern in whether the remaining 
characteristics were associated with risk, benefit or both. 
As the purpose of the focus groups was to identify salient risk characteristics, many of the 17 
products were similar in terms of product class but differed on certain qualities, e.g. fresh vs. 
frozen vegetables, conventional vs. organic chocolate etc. In order to meet space restraints in 
the survey, the number of products was reduced to five. The food products were selected so 
that each product would include a combination of specific risks and benefits. Three novel 
food items were added, resulting in a total of eight food risk items. The novel food items 
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included still play a very little role in the Danish food consumption: There are very few 
functional food products in Danish supermarkets, genetically modified food has to be labeled 
and the European Union has banned production and import of beef treated with growth 
hormones. However, these risk items were included in order to shed light on consumer 
attitudes to novel food product and not just the specific technologies behind the products. 
Based on the initial hypotheses and a categorization of the risk characteristics from the focus 
groups, the eight products were selected so that they would match four overall categories: 1) 
Conventional food, 2) candy, 3) food that was labeled as organic or fair trade, and 4) novel 
food (table I).  
   
Table I. Risk items and Risk characteristics 
 Risk Items Risk characteristics 
1. Carrots a. Effects on climate/environment 
2. Fairtrade labelled coffee b. Effects on animal welfare/working conditions 
3. Organic rolled seasoned meat c. Effects of pesticides/additives on personal health 
4. Fresh Danish chicken d. Effects of sugar/fat level on personal health 
5. Winegums e. Effects of vitamin/nutrition level on personal health 
6. Cornflakes based on genetically modified corn f. Health effects from harmful bacteria/microorganisms 
7. Beef from animals fed with growth hormones g. Overall benefit 
8. Vitamin enriched convenience food h. Level of control over risk 
  i. Overall risk 
 
3. METHOD 
The survey data was obtained in October 2010 from an online consumer panel in 
collaboration with the Danish Cooperative Consumer Organization FDB. 1001 respondents 
returned the questionnaire.  
 
3.1. The Questionnaire 
The questionnaire was based on the combination of eight risk items and nine risk 
characteristics (including a general risk assessment), resulting in 72 questions, arranged as 
71 
 
nine batteries. The questionnaire included 23 additional questions not pertinent to the present 
study, which resulted in a total of 95 questions. Participants were asked to rate the risk 
characteristics on a five-point scale. The question structure in the batteries from a. to e. 
included a positive as well as a negative dimension. These questions favored bipolar scales, 
and the scales were anchored between ‘very positively’ and ‘very negatively’. The structure 
of the remaining questions from f. to i. favored traditional rating scales. These scales were 
anchored between ‘none’ and ‘very large’. In order to avoid question order bias the question 
order was randomized, except for the questions concerning control and overall risk/benefit (g, 
h, i) which appeared at the end of the questionnaire.  
 
3.2. Participants 
3.2.1. Data imputation 
Some questionnaires were returned with too many blanks. Respondents who had completed 
less than 85 percent of the total of 95 questions were omitted, resulting in 732 useable 
questionnaires. 
 
2.2.2. Sample and Respondents 
The sample used to analysis (n = 732) were comprised of 49.6% women and 50.4 % men, 
28.8 % between 15 and 34 years, 40,2 % between 35 and 54 years and 31.0 % between 55 and 
74 years. Twenty-one percent were living alone, 4.4 % were living in families comprised of 
one adult with one or more children, 39.2 % were living as a couple without children, 29.9 % 
were living as a couple with children. The remaining 4.8 % were children around 18 years old 
about to settle alone. 
 
2.5. Data Analysis 
72 
 
As the respondents were sampled from an online panel, weights can be assessed for all of the 
respondents and, furthermore, separate weights for the included and omitted subsamples.  
There were found no differences of gender distribution, age distribution, occupational 
distribution and also no differences between included and omitted respondents with respect to 
income etc. Furthermore, there were found no differences of the weights for the included and 
omitted respondents. The factor analyses were performed with and without weights giving the 
same conclusions of the analyses. In the factor analyses missing were replaced by mean 
values, however, performing list wise exclusion or pair wise exclusion leads to the same 
conclusions. 
The method of extraction was principal components and the solution was rotated using the 
varimax method to clarify ambiguous loadings and obtain a simple structure. The decision 
about how many components were appropriate for each PCA was made using the scree figure 
and including factors with eigenvalues greater than one. 
 
3. RESULTS 
Table II shows the mean ratings of the responses to the questionnaire. The full range of 
possible scores was observed for all scales and there were no floor and ceiling effects. 
As could be expected the mean values of benefit and nutrition regarding carrots were high, 
while these characteristics were perceived to be very low for wine gums. The novel food 
products were rated as more risky and less beneficial than the remaining products. In 
general risk and benefit appear to be negatively correlated. 
While the mean ratings of most characteristics in general show much variance across 
products, control appears to be rated consistently with a variance across product between 
2,0 and 3,0. 
  
73 
 
Table II. Risk perceptions of all food products (mean values) 
  
1. 
Carrots 
2. 
Coffee 
3. 
Meat  
4. 
Chicken 
5. 
Winegums 
6. 
Cornflakes 
7. 
Beef  
8. 
Conv.food 
a. Effects on clima/environment 3,6 3,6 3,3 3,0 2,4 2,2 1,9 2,3 
b. Effects on animal welfare/working conditions 3,6 3,9 3,5 2,9 2,6 2,3 2,0 2,5 
c. Effects of pesticides/additives on personal 
health 3,0 2,9 2,9 2,7 1,9 1,9 1,7 2,1 
d. Effects of sugar/fat on personal health 4,0 3,2 2,7 3,3 1,8 2,2 2,2 2,1 
e. Effects of vitamin/nutrition on personal health 4,3 3,2 3,2 3,5 2,0 2,4 2,2 2,5 
f. Health effects from harmful bacteria/microorg. 2,0 2,2 2,5 3,0 2,8 3,1 3,6 3,1 
g. Overall benefit 4,3 3,4 3,2 3,5 1,7 2,1 1,9 2,1 
h. Control over risk 3,0 2,9 2,8 2,7 2,3 2,1 2,0 2,2 
i. Overall risk 2,0 2,2 2,5 2,7 3,3 3,6 3,8 3,5 
 
 
3.1. Exploratory factor analysis 
Data from the pre-study suggested that consumers rate different risk items according to 
different risk characteristics. However, one of the main benefits from factor analysis, as it is 
used in psychometric studies, is that it provides a mental map which offers the possibility of 
comparing a large number of hazards with respect to a number of risk characteristics. Hence, 
a principle component analysis was made on the collection of all food products (Appendix A). 
The purpose of this analysis was mainly exploratory; to see if some risk characteristics would 
cluster in factors across risk items. 
The Principal Component Analysis shows a large number of factors, each with relatively little 
explanatory power as to the percentage of variance explained. The two main factors explain 
only 20% of the variance. The cluster of risk characteristics in the first factor, explaining 13% 
of the variance, yields no consistent pattern with regards to the risk characteristics. Rather it 
seems that the common denominator correlates with the risk items; all the factor loadings on 
this factor are produced by attitudes to novel foods. Control comes out as second largest 
factor, explaining 7% of the variance. In this case the factor comprises all risk items. Thus, 
perceived control appears to be an issue that relates equally to all food products.  
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Most of the remaining factors seem to be results of general attitudes towards the specific 
products, while only a few are comprised by common risk characteristics across different 
products. Most noticeable is that perceived general risk emerges as an independent factor (4% 
of the variance), comprising all the products except the two novel food products with GMO 
and hormones. The risk from harmful bacteria emerged on two factors; one comprising novel 
food and wine gums (3% of the variance) and the remaining products on the other (4% of the 
variance).  
In sum, no consistent pattern was found in the exploratory factor analysis. The only 
significant findings at this level of analysis were that control is a consistent factor across all 
products, general risk loaded on one factor across most products and risk from harmful 
bacteria loaded on two factors. As these factors are small (explaining between 3% and 7% of 
the variance), their explanatory power is rather poor. 
 
3.2. Separate Principal Component Analyses 
Separate principal components analyses (PCA) were performed for each of the eight food 
products in order to identify distinctions and similarities. It was of particular interest to see if 
there were any signs of stigma and halo effects as hypothesized. Since control came out as an 
independent, although rather small, factor in the exploratory factor analysis, it was 
furthermore of interest to see what role this control factor would play in the assessments of 
individual product. 
 Most of the separate PCAs resulted in two component solutions, each explaining roughly 
50% of the variance. However, as could be expected from the pre-study and the exploratory 
factor analysis, the factor loadings were rather dissimilar across products. Some products, 
most noticeably within the category of novel foods, came out with only one component, also 
explaining about 50% of the variance. 
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3.2.1. Conventional food products  
The PCA on carrots resulted in a two component solution explaining 51% of the variance 
(Table III). Benefit and risk load highest on the first factor, which explains 32% of the 
variance. The remaining loadings on this factor all relate to personal health. The second 
factor, which explains 19% of the variance, is dominated by characteristics that one way or 
another relate to environmental issues. The data from the pre-study suggested that the effects 
of pesticides are assessed mainly in terms on their impact on human health, and therefore 
pesticides were grouped together with additives in a single characteristic in the survey. The 
high loading of this characteristic on the second factor, together with characteristics 
concerning environmental issues, suggest that the respondents differentiate between effects on 
humans and effects on nature, and in this case the effects on nature have been decisive. 
Control loads relatively high on the second factor, suggesting that control is an issue with 
respect to environmental concerns. However, the perceived risks as well as benefits appear to 
be associated almost exclusively with effects on personal health.  
 
 
Table III. Rotated PCA on carrots 
  
Component 
Personal health 
(32%) 
Environment 
(19%) 
Benefit ,800 ,091 
Risk -,718 -,066 
Bacteria -,711 -,051 
Nutrition ,677 ,219 
Fat/sugar ,528 ,381 
Pesticides/additives -,029 ,784 
Control ,098 ,592 
Climate/environment ,499 ,512 
Animal welf/work cond ,453 ,497 
 
 
76 
 
The PCA on chicken meat resulted in a two component solution explaining 52% of the 
variance (Table IV). The first factor explains 28% of the variance, whereas the second factor 
explains 24%. There is no distinction between personal health and environmental issues as 
found in the assessment of carrots. But the second factor shows that the risk from bacterial 
contamination is important in the assessments of risk from chicken meat. Risk and benefit do 
not load on the same factor; the first factor accounts for benefits pertinent to both health and 
environmental issues, whereas risk appears to be exclusively associated with negative health 
effects from bacterial contamination. A possible explanation for this is that previous food 
scares concerning salmonella still have an important impact on consumer attitudes towards 
chicken meat.  
 
Table IV. Rotated PCA on chicken 
  
Component 
Health/environment 
(28%) 
Bacteria 
(24%) 
Fat/sugar ,784 ,027 
Pesticides/additives ,674 ,030 
Climate/environment ,627 ,419 
Nutrition ,625 ,362 
Benefit ,584 ,490 
Animal welf/work cond ,486 ,458 
Control ,279 ,206 
Bacteria -,056 -,829 
Risk -,187 -,794 
 
 
3.2.2. Candy 
The PCA on wine gums resulted in a two component solution explaining 54% of the variance 
(Table V). The first factor, which accounts for 31% of the variance, concerns characteristics 
related to traditional life style risks. The main issue appears to be the effects of sugar on 
personal health which together with additives and (lack of) benefit and nutrition load high on 
77 
 
this factor. Control loads on this factor as well, but rather low. While this factor appears to 
account for concerns regarding lifestyle risks, these concerns are associated with (lack of) 
benefit rather than risk.  
Risk loads on the second factor together with health effects from bacterial contamination, 
animal welfare and environmental issues, explaining 23% of the variance. An explanation for 
this conjunction of apparently dissimilar risk characteristics could be the effects of the BSE 
scare, where the European Union banned export of British beef and cattle as well as their 
derivatives such as wine gums. The main concern appears to be the effects on personal health 
from bacteria, but in the BSE case these concerns go hand in hand with concerns over animal 
welfare and, perhaps to a lesser degree, the environment. 
 
Table V. Rotated PCA on winegums 
  
Component 
Personal health 
(31%) 
Bacteria 
(23%) 
Fat/sugar ,839 ,050 
Benefit ,757 ,169 
Nutrition ,749 ,187 
Pesticides/additives ,710 ,249 
Control ,249 ,193 
Bacteria ,042 -,824 
Risk -,210 -,718 
Animal welf/work cond ,380 ,624 
Climate/environment ,479 ,544 
 
3.2.3. Organic and fair-trade labeled food 
The PCA on organic rolled seasoned meat1 resulted in a single component solution explaining 
38% of the variance (Table VI). Benefit loads highest on this factor, whereas effects on 
personal health from both bacterial contamination and from fat load surprisingly low. The 
level of saturated fat in rolled seasoned meat is generally high and cold meat is a major source 
for bacterial contamination. Thus, it should be expected that these risk characteristics would 
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load higher. An explanation for this, as well as for the single factor solution, could be the 
hypothesized halo effect. Previous studies suggest that consumers perceive organic food to 
have a variety of benefits, and it is plausible that labeling a food product as organic will have 
a general risk attenuating effect. 
 
Table VI. PCA on organic rolled seasoned meet 
  Component 
Halo effect (38%) 
Benefit ,766 
Nutrition ,694 
Climate/environment ,641 
Animal welf/work cond ,633 
Risk -,620 
Pesticides/additives ,590 
Bacteria -,585 
Fat/sugar ,577 
Control ,377 
 
 
The PCA on fair-trade labeled coffee resulted in a two component solution explaining 49% of 
the variance (Table VII). The first factor, explaining 25% of the variance, is difficult to 
explain. Most characteristics relate to personal health, but effects on climate and environment 
are salient in this factor as well. Level of fat, sugar and nutrition loadhighest, but these are 
hardly important concerns with regard to coffee.  Like most of the other two factor solutions, 
risk and benefit load on different factors.  
The second factor, explaining 24% of the variance, consists of general risk and animal 
welfare/working conditions, the latter probably being of main concern in this case. A possible 
explanation for why risk is related to working conditions could be media attention on the 
issue, but it could also be that the fair-trade label directs attention this way.  
Risk from bacterial contamination also loads on this factor, which seems odd. There are no 
known risks from bacteria in coffee, and, what is perhaps even more puzzling, it would be 
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rather difficult to find any connection between bacteria and working conditions. But risk and 
bacteria load together on the same factor in all the two component solutions. While this 
structure is somewhat strange with respect to this particular food product, it suggests that in 
general people associate food risks with the effects of bacterial contamination. Again, control 
loads low. 
There is nothing that indicates the presence of any halo effect. But admittedly, the two factor 
solution may be a consequence of the fact that most of the risk characteristics are irrelevant to 
this particular product. 
 
Table VII. Rotated PCA on fair-trade coffee 
  
Component 
Personal health? 
(25%) 
Ethics? 
 (24%) 
Fat/sugar ,738 ,021 
Nutrition ,676 ,164 
Pesticides/additives ,653 ,090 
Climate/environment ,554 ,490 
Benefit ,538 ,451 
Risk -,058 -,807 
Bacteria ,006 -,759 
Animal welf/work cond ,391 ,580 
Control ,250 ,343 
 
 
3.2.4. Novel foods 
The PCA on all of the three novel food products resulted in remarkably similar single 
component solutions explaining roughly 50% of the variance: 52% for cornflakes with GMO, 
50% for beef with hormones and 48% for vitamin enriched convenience food (Table VIII). 
In all three cases benefit loads highest together with the effects on personal health form 
nutrition and pesticides/additives. Risk loads moderately and control loads surprisingly low. 
Most studies into biotechnology and genetically modifies food suggest that risk, and 
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especially the unknown and uncontrollable effects, is the main driver in lay people attitudes. 
While there is no reason to question these previous findings, it appears, however, that when 
asked to assess concrete products instead of the more abstract technologies, consumers tend to 
focus more on the (absence of) benefits. 
The single factor solution in all three cases suggests that the risk perceptions are indistinct, 
thus providing some evidence for the hypothesis that these products are subject to 
stigmatization.  
 
Table VIII. PCAs on three novel food products  
  
Cornflakes 
(GMO) 
Beef  
(hormones) 
Conv.food 
(+vitamin) 
  
Stigma effect 
(52%) 
Stigma effect 
(50%) 
Stigma effect 
(48%) 
Benefit ,830 ,815 ,811 
Nutrition ,797 ,790 ,767 
Pesticides/additives ,790 ,802 ,762 
Clima/environment ,787 ,747 ,746 
Risk -,771 -,775 -,718 
Animal welf/work cond ,756 ,706 ,702 
Bacteria -,663 -,608 -,604 
Fat/sugar ,645 ,652 ,700 
Control ,319 ,382 ,241 
 
 
4. DISCUSSION 
The main aim of this study was to explore how lay people perceive risk from food when 
assessing concrete products instead of specific risk items. It was hypothesized that this setup 
would reflect the decisions consumers make in purchase situations, and that the sense of 
personal control in these situations would result in control being of less importance in the 
assessment of food products. Control did come out as an independent, however rather small, 
factor in the exploratory factor analysis. In the separate factor analyses, however, the general 
picture indicates that control is not a salient concern. The low loadings on the component 
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analyses of separate products, together with the consistency in mean ratings across the 
different products, indicate that perceived control is not affected by any distinct product traits. 
Some studies argue that perceived control correlates with individual psychological traits such 
as e.g. self-esteem.(45) Since the mean values used in the study do not take individual 
variances into account, this would explain why the assessment of control is remarkably stable.  
In many cases perceived control appears together with perceived overall risk. However, in 
general perceived risk appears to be marginal compared to perceived benefit in the 
respondents’ attitudes toward the products. Perhaps it should not come as a surprise that 
perceived benefits play an important role in consumers’ assessments of risks associated with 
concrete food products. Apart from being a vital source for survival, food is also a major 
source for enjoyment and pleasure.(13,14,15)  
Some of the analyses show that environmental concerns play an important role in the general 
attitudes toward the presented products. These concerns, however, tend to be associated with 
benefit, or perhaps lack thereof. Risk appears to be narrowly defined as the risk of being 
contaminated with harmful microorganisms and bacteria: these two characteristics loads 
together in all the two component solutions.  
This narrow understanding of risk is particularly salient for products that have been subject to 
previous food scares. Food scares have been shown to have a negative impact on sales,(46,31) 
but in general sales gradually regain their previous level when the problem is solved and 
negative media attention disappears.(47) Although consumers gradually readopt their previous 
purchase behavior when a food scare is over,  the scare may have left a cognitive imprint. 
While consumers may forgive (or lack other options), the findings of this study indicates that 
they do not forget: Both chicken and wine gums (containing gelatin from cows) have been 
subject to previous food scares and concerns over bacterial contamination are salient in the 
two component solution regarding these products. 
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The effect of this imprint is that these and similar products become more crisis prone. Not 
only because the original or a similar food scare can reemerge giving cause to further 
uncertainty and anxiety, but also because individual products and brands become easy targets 
for ‘manufactured uncertainty’(1)  and rumors. In such cases the dependence on public 
perceptions is likely to cause severe harm to the product’s brand equity, which in these 
circumstances is a fragile asset.(48) 
It was hypothesized that some of the products in the study would be subject to a stigma effect 
while others would benefit from a halo effect. The results indicate that this is the case. 
Whereas the products categorized as conventional food tended to come out with two 
component solutions, generally concerning personal health and environmental concerns, most 
of the other products were presented in single factor solutions. The single factor solution, 
together with the general positive assessment, indicates that the organic meat product benefits 
from a halo effect, whereas there were no traces of this effect with respect to fair-trade coffee. 
The remarkably similar single factor solutions concerning the novel food products provide 
some evidence in favor of a stigma effect. The mean ratings for these products showed that 
they are perceived to be more risky and less beneficial, especially with respect to 
environmental effects and the impact of pesticides/additives. Other studies have shown how 
consumers rate novel food and the technologies behind them negatively because of their 
‘unnaturalness’(49) and that the moral disassociation from ‘tampering with nature’(50,51) is an 
important driver in shaping attitudes toward new technologies. It is possible that the attitudes 
towards novel food products in the present study are driven by this ‘tampering with nature’ 
effect. 
But contrary to what was expected, perceived risk loaded significantly lower than perceived 
benefit on all one component solutions for the novel food products. While it is no surprise that 
food products in general are assessed in terms of their benefits rather than in terms of their 
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risks, previous studies suggest that consumers perceive food associated with biotechnology to 
be high risk man-made hazards which are difficult to control.(35) However, it appears  that 
similar to food safety in general, consumers assess the concrete novel food products 
differently from how they assess the circumstances and technologies behind the product. 
This finding, that consumers assess novel food products mainly in terms of their benefits, 
offers some new perspectives, especially concerning genetically modified foods, which are 
subject to recurring public debates over their potential and unknown risks. 
Most studies find that public opposition to biotechnology in food production is driven by risk 
perceptions.  However, a study by Gaskell and colleagues(52) suggests that the assumptions 
behind most studies in GM food are subject to a ‘misperception of risk perception’. As is the 
case in the present study, their findings suggest that it is mainly lack of perceived benefits that 
cause public opposition to GM food. Hence, they recommend that risk communication should 
focus more on benefits and less on risks. 
Environmentalists and other skeptical stakeholders have been successful in setting the public 
agenda concerning novel food and the use of biotechnology.  As a consequence these debates 
focus almost exclusively on risk issues. Under these circumstances it may be difficult for 
industry and regulators to promote benefits at the expense of the voiced concerns over risk 
issues, at least when these issues are subject to political debates.  
But if lack of perceived benefits is the main barrier to the acceptance of novel food, and the 
present study suggests that this is the case, there are reasons to believe that there is a market 
for novel food products, including GM food, if marketers are successful in promoting the 
benefits of these products.   
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4.1. Limitations and further research  
The present study has identified both similarities and distinctions in risk perceptions across a 
number of food products. But since the number of food products in the study was limited, 
there is reason to caution against overgeneralization of the findings. The differences in risk 
perceptions across products found in this study also call for attention on the appropriateness 
of the risk characteristics used in the study: The puzzling two component solution for fair-
trade coffee illustrated that many characteristics were less relevant to this product. 
This problem, which mainly concerns the number and the specificity of the risk 
characteristics, could perhaps be solved in future studies by dividing  the four main product 
categories (conventional food, novel food, candy and special label food) into more distinct 
subcategories.  If general patterns in risk perceptions within these subcategories should 
emerge, this would offer a better foundation for comparisons across product classes. 
 
NOTES 
1. Rolled seasoned meat is a very common Danish charcuterie. It is from pork or lamb and 
contains a high level of saturated fat. 
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Appendix A. Exploratory rotated factor analysis for all products 
  1 
(13%) 
2 
(8%) 
3 
(5%) 
4 
(5%) 
5 
(5%) 
6 
(4%) 
7 
(4%) 
8 
(4%) 
9 
(4%) 
10 
(4%) 
11 
(4%) 
12 
(3%) 
13 
(3%) 
14 
(3%) 
15 
(3%) 
16 
(2%) 
Benefit(g) - beef(7) ,778 ,082 ,069 ,012 ,043 -,009 -,108 -,024 -,016 ,092 ,051 ,014 -,036 ,027 -,041 ,122 
Benefit(g) - cornfl(6) ,777 ,046 ,135 ,036 ,037 ,047 ,008 -,088 ,004 ,139 ,070 -,034 ,072 ,073 -,120 -,272 
Clima/envir(a) - cornfl(6) ,748 ,043 ,114 -,018 ,076 -,036 ,005 -,023 ,023 ,120 -,054 -,064 ,128 -,001 ,118 -,182 
Vitamin/nutrition(e) - 
cornfl(6) 
,739 -,016 ,108 -,057 ,083 ,130 ,084 -,233 ,039 ,139 ,010 -,060 -,083 ,097 -,108 -,124 
Ani welf/work cond(b) - 
cornfl(6) 
,731 ,088 ,019 ,011 ,012 ,028 ,012 -,107 -,013 ,074 ,028 -,048 -,005 -,026 ,288 -,068 
Pesticides/add(c) -  cornfl(6) ,728 ,067 ,183 ,331 -,062 -,048 -,041 -,068 ,012 ,139 ,019 ,040 -,076 -,044 ,020 -,187 
Vitamin/nutrition(e) - beef(7) ,728 ,020 ,090 -,039 ,026 ,034 -,014 -,184 -,043 ,066 ,027 ,014 -,174 ,120 -,034 ,199 
Risk(i) - cornfl(6) -,696 -,003 -,041 ,026 ,031 ,041 ,079 ,217 ,447 -,099 ,092 ,038 -,061 -,007 ,114 ,052 
Pesticides/add(c) - beef(7) ,688 ,079 ,196 ,283 -,015 -,110 -,125 -,011 ,069 ,084 -,113 ,108 -,116 -,123 ,047 ,131 
Risk(i) - beef(7) -,688 -,035 -,045 ,023 ,007 ,061 ,162 ,128 ,423 -,080 ,180 ,059 -,015 ,031 ,051 -,270 
Clima/envir(a) - beef(7) ,684 ,020 ,138 ,014 ,058 -,106 -,080 ,065 ,035 ,087 -,168 ,015 -,020 -,056 ,284 ,159 
Ani welf/work cond(b) - 
beef(7) 
,666 ,021 ,087 ,020 ,056 -,024 -,063 ,098 ,054 ,001 -,068 -,003 -,045 -,106 ,352 ,302 
Sugar/fat(d) - beef(7) ,567 ,032 ,092 ,086 -,001 ,037 -,072 -,091 -,018 ,097 -,035 ,468 -,173 ,034 ,101 -,097 
Ani welf/work cond(b) - 
conv.food(8) 
,510 ,020 -,024 ,023 ,017 ,058 ,015 -,049 -,031 ,407 ,038 -,004 -,012 -,050 ,475 ,034 
Sugar/fat(d) - cornfl(6) ,495 ,039 ,229 ,039 -,033 ,076 -,010 -,092 ,037 ,217 -,047 ,383 -,147 ,035 ,054 -,364 
Control(h) - org meat(3) -,047 ,845 -,048 ,069 ,020 ,186 ,099 -,031 -,028 -,029 ,004 ,015 -,054 -,068 ,051 -,069 
Control(h) - conv.food(8) ,164 ,839 ,095 ,009 -,057 -,008 -,054 -,065 -,001 ,077 -,099 -,010 ,033 ,061 -,052 ,037 
Control(h) - cornfl(6) ,213 ,835 ,135 -,002 -,047 -,008 -,063 -,030 ,025 ,031 -,087 -,047 ,069 ,068 -,063 ,030 
Control(h) - winegums(5) ,039 ,822 ,157 ,038 -,054 -,007 -,019 -,054 ,025 ,105 -,002 -,035 ,001 ,030 ,105 ,009 
Control(h) -coffee(2) -,085 ,820 -,034 ,103 -,027 ,065 ,255 ,047 -,043 -,052 ,037 ,009 -,037 -,066 ,030 -,036 
Control(h) - chicken(4) -,027 ,813 -,053 ,064 ,262 ,023 ,041 -,003 -,035 -,015 ,030 ,070 -,069 -,066 ,040 -,032 
Control(h) - beef(7) ,241 ,798 ,147 -,020 -,066 -,006 -,103 -,020 ,021 -,030 -,118 ,017 ,026 ,043 -,033 ,153 
Control(h) - carrots(1) -,059 ,783 -,094 ,097 ,024 -,005 ,057 ,047 -,050 -,005 ,188 ,097 ,084 -,073 ,026 -,061 
Sugar/fat(d) - winegums(5) ,124 ,064 ,755 ,062 ,071 -,043 -,006 ,076 ,014 ,086 -,228 ,185 -,038 -,024 ,086 -,009 
Benefit(g) - winegums(5) ,234 ,140 ,743 ,027 ,031 ,090 -,042 -,001 ,065 ,075 -,006 -,043 ,016 ,022 ,034 -,065 
Vitamin/nutrition(e) - 
winegums(5) 
,212 ,048 ,718 -,046 ,061 ,046 ,047 -,081 -,058 ,035 -,163 -,074 -,083 ,110 ,059 ,130 
Pesticides/add(c) - 
winegums(5) 
,243 ,003 ,609 ,397 -,048 -,027 ,002 -,077 ,020 ,127 -,109 -,024 -,094 -,105 ,193 -,013 
Pesticides/add(c) - carrots(1) ,062 ,139 ,013 ,808 ,064 ,035 ,005 ,026 -,055 ,042 ,099 ,028 ,179 -,014 -,009 ,000 
Pesticides/add(c) - chicken(4) ,116 ,036 ,067 ,805 ,342 ,015 ,001 -,040 -,011 ,057 ,055 ,096 ,053 -,059 -,009 -,021 
Pesticides/add(c) - coffee(2) ,045 ,074 ,060 ,797 -,071 ,072 ,342 -,016 ,024 ,010 ,010 ,145 ,002 -,046 -,023 ,062 
Pesticides/add(c) - org 
meat(3) 
,038 ,091 ,008 ,769 -,041 ,407 ,025 -,078 -,015 ,017 -,026 ,109 ,032 -,007 ,014 -,036 
Clima/envir(a) - chicken(4) ,044 ,008 ,062 ,108 ,758 ,132 ,136 ,120 -,003 ,086 -,093 ,108 ,267 -,073 ,084 -,066 
Benefit(g) - chicken(4) ,096 -,023 ,014 -,013 ,708 ,121 ,071 ,071 -,092 -,032 ,420 ,065 -,061 -,066 -,060 -,070 
Ani welf/work cond(b) - 
chicken(4) 
,038 ,000 ,114 ,062 ,693 ,156 ,092 ,093 ,022 ,035 -,130 -,045 ,364 -,021 ,099 ,029 
Vitamin/nutrition(e) - 
chicken(4) 
,073 -,026 -,065 ,034 ,640 ,211 ,053 -,095 -,019 ,049 ,465 ,106 -,124 ,030 -,031 ,256 
Benefit(g) - org meat(3) ,019 ,066 ,127 ,087 ,104 ,761 ,166 ,095 -,020 ,038 ,144 ,029 -,035 -,130 -,046 -,169 
Vitamin/nutrition(e) -org 
meat(3) 
,039 ,028 ,077 ,075 ,146 ,723 ,104 ,007 -,033 ,063 ,171 ,003 -,042 -,020 -,119 ,277 
Ani welf/work cond(b) -org 
meat(3) 
-,064 ,056 -,156 ,143 ,117 ,622 ,171 -,126 -,044 -,058 ,028 ,015 ,303 ,085 ,159 ,008 
Clima/envir(a) - org meat(3) -,091 ,091 -,074 ,115 ,284 ,536 ,229 ,011 -,019 ,058 -,191 ,120 ,119 -,025 ,274 -,081 
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Sugar/fat(d) - org meat(3) ,050 ,036 ,256 ,069 ,089 ,522 -,087 ,207 -,023 ,075 -,081 ,475 ,194 -,116 -,076 ,061 
Benefit(g) - coffee(2) -,002 ,070 ,113 ,011 ,097 ,210 ,728 ,134 ,003 -,032 ,121 -,045 ,024 -,165 -,133 -,123 
Clima/envir(a) - coffee(2) -,160 ,046 -,102 ,137 ,143 ,071 ,704 ,038 -,011 ,056 -,001 ,123 ,263 -,055 ,159 ,006 
Ani welf/work cond(b) - 
coffee(2) 
-,139 ,039 -,183 ,162 ,016 ,173 ,616 -,130 -,112 -,031 ,129 ,018 ,277 ,166 ,119 -,006 
Vitamin/nutrition(e) - 
coffee(2) 
-,021 ,074 ,152 ,015 ,131 ,181 ,590 ,095 ,111 ,065 ,077 ,070 -,036 -,135 -,144 ,450 
Harmful bacteria(f) - 
winegums(5) 
-,078 -,034 -,240 -,050 ,161 -,053 ,053 ,746 ,150 ,026 -,184 -,066 ,037 ,074 -,172 ,077 
Harmful bacteria(f) - confl(6) -,504 -,030 ,035 -,018 ,026 ,018 ,016 ,733 ,079 -,005 ,017 ,000 ,024 ,102 ,028 ,125 
Harmful bacteria(f) - 
conv.food(8) 
-,268 -,035 ,032 -,044 -,016 ,055 -,007 ,695 ,108 -,382 -,025 -,009 ,043 ,165 -,058 -,046 
Harmful bacteria(f) - beef(7) -,458 -,035 ,001 -,033 ,011 ,042 ,117 ,650 ,031 ,003 ,132 ,015 ,094 ,146 -,023 -,134 
Risk(i) - org meat(3) ,022 -,093 ,111 -,075 -,081 -,469 -,037 ,067 ,654 -,024 ,010 -,066 ,124 ,213 -,023 ,084 
Risk(i) - coffee(2) ,073 -,031 ,065 -,018 -,048 ,006 -,540 ,128 ,636 ,014 -,131 ,020 ,061 ,124 -,009 ,012 
Risk(i) - chicken(4) -,105 -,026 ,008 -,044 -,537 -,062 ,000 -,021 ,614 ,065 -,116 -,005 ,051 ,233 ,063 -,054 
Risk(i) - winegums(5) -,148 ,027 -,430 ,018 ,106 -,042 ,108 ,280 ,585 -,064 -,034 ,000 -,027 -,091 -,194 -,014 
Risk(i) - conv.food(8) -,491 ,004 -,049 ,007 ,037 ,077 ,057 ,174 ,559 -,434 ,073 ,068 -,080 ,014 ,001 -,113 
Risk(i) - carrots(1) ,073 -,023 ,169 -,013 -,086 ,059 -,068 ,035 ,483 ,056 -,408 -,068 -,229 ,311 -,035 ,145 
Vitamin/nutrition(e) - conv. 
Food(8) 
,442 ,003 ,080 -,024 ,056 ,106 ,117 -,153 -,038 ,676 ,064 -,026 -,038 ,081 -,055 ,053 
Benefit(g) - conv.food(8) ,516 ,021 ,142 ,071 ,054 ,062 -,004 -,004 -,048 ,640 ,060 -,051 ,072 ,063 ,007 -,024 
Sugar/fat(d) - conv.food(8) ,356 ,048 ,199 ,061 -,015 ,056 -,078 ,005 ,005 ,612 -,115 ,373 -,018 -,074 ,058 -,099 
Pesticides/add(c) - 
conv.food(8) 
,456 ,040 ,094 ,389 -,037 -,032 -,035 -,061 -,029 ,567 -,023 ,041 -,076 -,062 ,088 -,002 
Clima/envir(a) - conv.food(8) ,474 ,053 ,082 -,009 ,086 ,007 ,029 -,055 ,029 ,532 -,090 -,052 -,010 ,000 ,388 -,002 
Vitamin/nutrition(e) - 
carrots(1) 
-,093 -,019 -,213 ,111 ,084 ,131 ,139 -,136 -,005 ,000 ,709 ,091 ,181 ,002 ,051 ,205 
Benefit(g) - carrots(1) -,099 -,033 -,204 -,008 ,095 ,046 ,129 ,058 -,082 -,003 ,699 ,119 ,215 -,167 -,008 -,153 
Sugar/fat(d) - chicken(4) -,006 ,078 -,054 ,201 ,437 ,061 -,013 -,075 -,056 ,023 ,236 ,651 ,039 ,027 -,004 -,027 
Sugar/fat(d) - carrots(1) -,127 ,045 -,221 ,167 -,001 ,037 ,063 -,087 -,024 -,049 ,419 ,614 ,250 ,049 ,050 -,051 
Sugar/fat(d) - coffee(2) -,082 -,007 ,090 ,143 -,020 ,082 ,428 ,039 ,055 -,006 ,034 ,612 ,174 -,010 -,060 ,145 
Ani welf/work cond(b) - 
carrots(1) 
-,101 ,016 -,019 ,090 ,131 ,118 ,159 ,062 ,010 -,019 ,225 ,078 ,751 -,056 -,013 ,066 
Clima/envir(a) - carrots(1) -,098 ,029 -,118 ,132 ,207 ,030 ,207 ,082 ,031 -,006 ,183 ,159 ,650 -,142 -,025 -,086 
Harmful bacteria(f) - org 
meat(3) 
,032 -,040 ,007 -,066 -,025 -,448 -,060 ,263 ,136 -,046 -,011 ,002 ,024 ,657 -,034 -,020 
Harmful bacteria(f)- 
chicken(4) 
-,088 -,035 -,116 -,062 -,477 -,054 -,031 ,077 ,087 ,056 ,051 ,051 -,028 ,618 ,039 -,098 
Harmful bacteria(f) - 
carrots(1) 
,020 ,017 ,160 -,079 -,046 ,060 -,096 ,136 ,172 ,007 -,360 ,004 -,309 ,610 -,008 ,048 
Harful bacteria(f) - coffee(2) ,077 -,049 ,072 -,030 ,035 -,030 -,368 ,460 ,178 -,030 -,115 -,038 -,063 ,537 -,011 -,014 
Ani welf/work cond(b) - 
winegums(5) 
,260 ,065 ,416 -,031 -,039 ,044 ,005 -,109 -,067 -,007 ,140 ,010 ,002 ,045 ,688 -,028 
Clima/envir(a) - 
winegums(5) 
,224 ,057 ,462 ,010 ,117 -,010 ,001 -,186 -,022 ,111 -,069 ,016 ,011 -,009 ,564 -,078 
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ABSTRACT: The present case study seeks to explain the conditions for the experts’ rational 
risk perception by analyzing the institutional contexts that constitute a field of food safety 
expertise in Denmark. The study highlights the role of risk reporting and how contextual 
factors affect risk reporting from the lowest organizational level, where concrete risks occur, 
to the highest organizational level, where the body of professional risk expertise is situated. 
The paper emphasizes the role of knowledge, responsibility, loyalty and trust as risk 
attenuation factors and concludes by suggesting that the preconditions for the expert’s 
rationality may rather be a lack of risk specific knowledge due to poor risk reporting than a 
superior level of risk knowledge. 
 
Keywords: Food Safety, Risk reporting, Social Amplification of Risk 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. The expert-lay dichotomy in risk studies 
In addressing the effects of institutional settings on the conditions for risk expertise the 
present study asks the overall question: How are risks reported to the risk expert and which 
factors affect the quality of the data reported? In order to answer this question it is necessary 
to look upon risk expertise as a network of knowledge rather than the risk expert as an 
isolated entity capable of making rational judgments in an institutional vacuum. In doing so, 
the present study challenges two underlying assumptions in many risk studies: 1) the risk 
expert as a rational actor unaffected by institutional irrationalities, and 2) the sharp division 
between risk experts and lay people. 
The massive amount of studies throughout the past forty years that have tried to answer the 
overall question about “how safe is safe enough”(1) has led risk perception studies to a 
distinction between experts’ rational risk perceptions and lay persons’ more emotional and 
contextual approaches to evaluating risks; a distinction which is one of the most debated 
issues within the risk field, both in quantity and persistence.(2) Departing from Starr’s(3) study 
of general attitudes towards risks, most studies within the psychometric paradigm have 
focused on lay risk perceptions and have scrutinized the basis for and subsequently nuanced 
earlier statements concerning the ’irrational’ risk perceptions of the general public.(4,5,6) This 
scientific progress within the psychometric paradigm have, however, been subject to some 
criticism, most enthusiastically from Sjöberg(7,8,9,10,11) who raises questions upon the lack of 
clarity regarding the definitions of experts vs. lay people in the early empirical studies and 
furthermore problematizes the presumption concerning the ‘allegedly simple structure of 
experts’ risk perception’.(12) In empirical studies among Swedish high school students Drottz-
Sjöberg and Sjöberg(13) have identified rational risk perceptions similar to those of experts and 
proposes a reversed causal relationship: It is not the expert knowledge that causes a certain 
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rational view on risks but rather certain world views that cause a given professional interest, 
which again may lead to a career as an expert.  
However, these explanations, both from the psychometric approach and from its critics, suffer 
from the fact that investigations of the risk perceptions are limited by the psychological 
approach of the studies behind them. The risk perceptions of experts (future or present) are 
brought forth by addressing respondents individually outside their organizational or 
institutional setting in which they make practical use of their expertise. In short, the studies 
assume that risk expertise exists in an institutional vacuum.  
 
1.2. The influence of institutional settings on risk perception and risk behaviour 
The development of the Social Amplification of Risk Framework (SARF)(14), which has 
grown to become an influential cross disciplinary framework for risk studies(15), overcome 
this problem of institutional vacuum as the framework takes into account the institutional 
context in which the risk perceptions are embedded.  The impact of organizational design on 
factors such as information availability, goal setting etc. and their consequences for decision 
making has been the object of many studies since Herbert Simon introduced the theory of 
‘bounded rationality’(16,17) – a theory which has been a major source of inspiration for the 
development of the psychometric paradigm as well.(18) But surprisingly few studies within the 
broad framework of SARF have questioned the rationality of risk experts on the basis of their 
organizational embeddedness. Rather studies within the framework, with very few 
exceptions(19), have replicated the initial knowledge divide between experts and lay persons. 
The mere name of the framework, with its emphasis on amplification and not attenuation, 
reflects this: the expert’s allegedly correct risk judgment is somehow distorted (amplified) in 
the course of communication sequences through different institutional layers, with the media 
as one of the most influential actors on the stage.(20) As in the psychometric studies the notion 
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of the expert as a rational actor remains unchallenged. The development and subsequent 
impact of Douglas’ cultural theory(21) has, however, challenged this notion and departing from 
this theoretical platform scholars like Adams have observed that experts like lay persons are 
informed by beliefs and worldviews and that experts are institutionally biased by their task to 
minimize risk, often to a level that exceeds a rational risk-benefit calculation(22).  Yet another 
source of criticism regarding the alleged rationality of risk expertise that take into account the 
institutional settings is to be found within the framework of science communication,(23) but 
with little impact on the traditional domain of risk analysis which has maintained the notion of 
a knowledge deficit between experts and lay persons as a theoretical cornerstone.  
 
1.3. The object of investigation 
As the body of professional risk expertise in organizations is often situated distant from where 
the actual risks occur it seems reasonable to assume that the institutional context will affect 
risk reporting. The reason behind the present study indicated this: From time to time the food 
and service company Compass Group Denmark experienced some critical incidents, but their 
risk reporting system failed to account for any risks prior to any of these incidents. In fact, 
risks were almost only reported under one of two conditions:  
1) When irregularities concerning food safety were discovered and prevention measures were 
implemented before risk exposure.  
2) Detection of infectious diseases among canteen guests due to improper hygiene procedures. 
 
What characterizes these two conditions is that the actual risk is not present: In the first case 
prevention measures have been taken and the risk is eliminated. In the second case the risk 
has exploited the potentiality of a bad outcome, which is a constitutional characteristic of risk. 
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This situation indicated that Compass Group’s risk reporting system was not reliable, thus 
making it an interesting object of investigation.  
Compass Group Denmark is the Danish division of the multinational food and service 
company Compass Group, PLC. In Denmark the main activities of the company is its catering 
business, a business operating around 220 canteens and personnel restaurants, each working 
with a relatively high degree of autonomy. With regards to food safety issues the canteens are 
linked directly to corporate headquarters through a hygiene department and indirectly via a 
district manager who refers to the operational management. 
As from 2002 the Danish Veterinary and Food Administration (DVFA) has made it 
mandatory for businesses in the food industry to launch self-inspection programmes, which 
direct businesses to self-inspections and subsequently documenting and reporting failures to 
comply with the governmental food safety standards. These standards follow the EU-
legislation and are organized in accordance with the principles embodied in the HACCP 
system (Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points). 
In the Danish division of Compass Group a common self-inspection programme covering all 
220 food production sites has been implemented. In order to make sure that risks are kept at a 
minimal level the hygiene department has made company specific standards even more 
stringent compared to the governmental standards. 
New hygiene and risk reduction procedures regarding the self-inspection programme as well 
as warnings about specific food products are communicated through an intranet, on e-mail 
and sometimes by phone, depending on the urgency of the matter.  Feedback in terms of 
failure reports are documented and archived as a part of the self-inspection programme. In 
severe cases, such as food poisoning among canteen guests, special procedures are used, but 
in case of less acute failures to comply with the governmental food safety standards it is 
sufficient to document those deviations, so that they are accessible to governmental control. 
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As illustrated in figure 1 the self-inspection programme of Compass Group function as an 
intermediary link between each canteen and the governmental food inspection agency, but it 
also links the canteen to the headquarters; a link that is also present through the operational 
line of command.  
 
 
 
These two links to the corporate headquarters serve each their own purpose: The operational 
line of command has its focus on economy, meeting budgets and ensuring that business is run 
in a profitable manner whereas the link to the hygiene department focuses on meeting food 
safety and hygiene standards. It is notable that whereas the operational manager is included in 
the company’s executive management the hygiene manager is not. It is equally notable that 
the operational management is not linked directly to the self-inspection programme. These 
observations indicate that concerns for profitability are prioritized at the expense of concerns 
for safety. 
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1.4. Preliminary hypotheses concerning risk reporting  
As noted the influence of organizational settings on the rationality of decision making has 
been an important component of decision making theory since the publication of Herbert 
Simon’s Administrative Behavior.(24) Rational behaviour implies complete access to and 
understanding of information. But as these preconditions are rarely met Simon’s notion about 
‘bounded rationality’ in organizations has guided the initial three hypotheses concerning how 
the canteen workers perceive and report risk. The aim of this study is not to confirm or reject 
the following hypotheses. Rather the hypotheses serve as a preliminary guide to 
understanding the behaviour of the persons responsible for risk reporting.  
 
The self-inspection programme does not just serve as a risk management tool for the 
individual business in the food industry. It is first and foremost a political instrument that 
serves to ensure acceptable food safety standards on a national level. The survival and 
legitimacy of any sovereign state rests upon the capacity to ensure its members safety and 
acceptable conditions for material reproduction.(25) Although these two capacities mutually 
precondition each other, finding the right balance between concern for production and 
concern for safety often lead to conflicts of interests and therefore creates problems for policy 
makers. A way of solving these sometimes insurmountable legitimacy problems is the 
fabrication of fantasy documents26 which serve as symbolic reassurances that risks are under 
control. As a political instrument the self-inspection programme has this reassuring function 
and if this function gets detached from the actual risk management function, the programme 
will fall into the category of fantasy documents. 
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H1: The overall conflict of policymaking is reproduced in the organizational setting of a 
company that has to balance the need for compliance with governmental safety regulations 
and concerns for profits, thus imposing a conflict of loyalty for risk reporters. 
 
 The fundamental problem is that risk taking is a way of optimizing productivity(27) whereas 
safety precautions serve the purpose of reducing risks. From a single perspective (e.g. the 
perspective of risk experts) it may be possible to balance risk taking and safety precautions to 
reach an optimum, but in a functionally differentiated social system(28) legislators and 
businesses often have different perspectives on and interpretations of risk issues. In the 
present study this would imply some tensions between the operational management’s wish for 
profits and the hygiene department’s wish to meet governmental safety regulations. 
This conflict is deeply rooted in the institutional setting surrounding the risk reporting 
behaviour, but psychological factors affect the quality of risk reports as well. Since Starr’s 
model of risk preferences(29) numerous studies have confirmed that the sense of being in 
control lead to biased and very optimistic risk perceptions. As risks in the present study can 
roughly be categorized in risk stemming from human errors (malpractice) and risks stemming 
from technological system errors (malfunction) it should be predictable to find human 
malpractice to be underrepresented in risk reports, because risk reporters are biased in their 
judgement of risks under their immediate control. Likewise technological malfunctions should 
be overrepresented. This bias may also be accompanied by a more conscious strategy at the 
lower organizational levels to counter the tendency at higher organizational levels to blame 
people and not systems.(30,31)  
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H2:  Risks concerning human malpractice should be underrepresented in the failure reports as 
they are perceived to be less risky as opposed to risks stemming from system malfunctions 
beyond immediate human control. 
 
A last hypothesis regarding risk severity has guided the study. Although a chain of minor 
irregularities may lead to major disasters(32) these latent conditions for accidents are found in 
almost all organizations.(33) There are many explanations for this risk negligence towards 
small risks. The third hypothesis offers an explanation by suggesting that reporting risks 
implies yet another risk dimension for the risk reporter. If too much attention is allocated to 
minor irregularities the risk reporter will appear to be less competent than his peers and he 
(rightfully or not) may fear sanctions from his superiors. Following from this a competition 
among peers implies that risks should be of a certain proportion before they are reported. 
 
H3: The perceived risk of getting caught in not having reported a risk (e.g. after risk 
exposure) should exceed the perceived risk of facing sanctions related to reporting minor 
risks. If not, risks are unlikely to be reported. 
 
Obviously H3 is correlated to H2 as the notion of control plays an important role in what is 
judged to be a minor irregularity. However, H3 could also be correlated to H1 as the 
additional risk dimension has to do with the organization’s strive for a smooth production line 
in order to optimize its profits. To sum up: the fewer risks reported, the fewer problems 
caused for the risk reporter as long as the risks don’t result in critical incidents. 
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2. METHOD 
2.1. Design and procedure  
The research design is a case study including a network analysis, onsite participant 
observations in 28 canteens, 56 semi structured interviews with canteen managers, chefs and 
canteen assistants, interview with the hygiene manager and results from a risk identification 
workshop with participants from executive management as well as district and canteen 
managers. The method applied in the study has followed the guidelines of grounded theory 
and the large amount of data has been coded in each step of the process to inform the next 
step and produce the three guiding hypothesis. The study was conducted in three parts: 
 
2.1.1 Risk identification workshop 
Part 1: A risk identification workshop was held as a joint project with the communication 
department in Compass Group Denmark. The CEO and members of executive management 
together with representatives from the canteens and district managers formed a group of 10 
individuals who spent a day together identifying risks and discussing major crisis scenarios. 
The primary scope of the workshop was to identify risks as a part of the issues and crisis 
management plan of the company. As a secondary scope the results of the workshop should 
function as a preliminary study of the priority of risks at different organizational levels. The 
data concerning food safety risks was coded in four main categories: 1) Risks related to 
suppliers, 2) risks related to system or technical failures, 3) risks related to employee attitudes 
and behaviour, and 4) risks related to compliance with safety procedures. 
 
2.1.2. In-depth interviews and network analysis 
Part 2: Prior to the field studies in the canteens two in-depth interviews with the hygiene 
manager were conducted. Between the two interviews an initial network analysis was made in 
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order to identify communication flows and key actors related to risk reporting procedures in 
the organization. The scope of the interviews was partly to disclose the hygiene manager’s 
risk perception regarding the food safety in the canteens and partly to get an initial perspective 
on what prevented canteen personnel from reporting risks. 
 
2.1.3. Field observations and semi-structured interviews 
Part 3: 28 canteens were selected on the basis of size and geographical location as 
stratification parameters. The smallest canteen employed two persons and the largest 
employed 18 persons. In the smallest canteens the manager which is responsible for risk 
reporting would be involved in all daily operations, whereas the manager of larger production 
sites rarely would be involved in the daily operations, thus introducing at least one more 
organizational layer in the chain of risk reporting. The geographical locations were selected so 
as to represent the major regions in Denmark, some near the corporate headquarters with face 
to face contact on a more regular basis and some very distant from headquarters and 
subsequently more dependent upon formal communication channels.  
The reason behind the selection was not to meet the requirements for statistical data 
processing, the study after all being a single case study, but rather to avoid bias stemming 
from extreme cases. On the basis of theoretical considerations, data from the pre-studies, and 
the subsequent preliminary hypotheses, two separate interview guides were constructed, each 
consisting of four themes: 1) Responsibility for reporting, 2) interpretation and priority of risk 
procedures, 3) potential conflicts of loyalty and 4) evaluation of current communication 
channels. 
The interview guide for canteen managers was tested and a pilot study of eight canteens 
including field observations and two interviews on each site were conducted. With some 
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modifications of the interview guide for non-managerial canteen personnel the rest of the 
studies were conducted according to the initial research design. 
As the scope of the study indisputably appeared controversial to the respondents (scrutinizing 
their reporting habits in situations where they did not meet governmental standards on food 
risk issues), a lot of effort was put into creating an atmosphere of mutual trust between the 
interviewer and the respondents. For that purpose the interviewer spent one and on some 
occasions two working days in the canteen working in the kitchen together with the 
respondents. This furthermore enabled the interviewer to refer to concrete field observations 
during the interview so as to avoid some of the standard ‘we are doing everything by the 
book’ answers that are most likely to occur when the questions are controversial. 
The interview guide was semi-structured and based on open-ended questions, which allows 
for some variance in terms of approaching the subjects from different angles, thus improving 
the likelihood of getting as much relevant data as possible. Each interview, with an average 
length of approx. 40 minutes, was taped and subsequently condensed to a shorter abstract. As 
the field observations mainly served the purpose of improving the quality of the interview 
data, the field notes were only included in the abstracts when necessary for understanding the 
context referred to in the interviews.  
The interview data was ad hoc coded during the two month of field work using generative 
coding. This allowed for a continuous modification of the interview guide so as to approach 
new issues and address new questions that appeared during the ad hoc coding process. The 
codes were compared and subsequently condensed into four major categories: 1) knowledge, 
2) responsibility, 3) loyalty, and 4) trust. Not surprisingly these categories reflect, at least to 
some degree, the themes from the interview guide and the preliminary hypotheses. But the 
combination of the semi-structured interview guide and the generative coding allowed for 
trust to appear as an independent factor not accounted for in the initial stage of the study. 
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3. RESULTS   
 3.1. Three risk personalities  
After the fieldwork a separate coding was made to categorize the respondents as it turned out 
that the respondents’ attitudes towards the reporting system correlated with some general 
demographic traits. This observation was important as their attitudes towards the risk 
reporting procedures not only affected their reliability as informants but presumably also as 
risk reporters. Although the attempt to create an atmosphere of trust in the interview situation 
by and large turned out to be successful it was evident that in some interviews the respondents 
were very reluctant to deviate from standard answers – even when confronted with 
contradictions in their own accounts.  
In coding the answers from all 56 respondents it became possible to identify three risk 
personalities. They should not be confused with Douglas’s cultural risk categories(34, 35), 
although some similarities between the categories exist (not surprisingly as they are very 
broadly defined categories). The categories identified in the present study are induced by 
empirical data and they concern people in a professional risk network. The personalities 
identified are: 
 
3.1.1 The sceptics 
The socio-demographic traits are: Often male with a professional education as a chef or 
similar. Usually hold a position as canteen manager in a large canteen after a career in hotels 
and a la carte-restaurants. Individuals in this category have a high professional self esteem and 
they feel that their professional identity is threatened by stringent rules that to some extent 
render their expertise superfluous. 
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They are most likely to overtly express their dissatisfaction with the rules as they consider 
their own professional expertise as superior to governmental food safety procedures. As such 
they are reliable informants as well as good sources for information concerning risks. 
 
3.1.2 The enthusiasts 
The socio-demographic traits are: Often female with a very short or no professional 
education. Usually hold a position as a canteen manager in a small canteen after having 
worked her way up in the canteen business. Individuals in this category use their knowledge 
about food safety as a surrogate for their lack of professional education. They are most likely 
to express their enthusiasm with the food safety rules. They have a tendency towards 
considering food safety as equivalent to food quality. When individuals in this category are 
confronted with rules which are difficult to integrate meaningfully in their work procedures 
they tend to be excessively creative in their interpretations of the rules. As informants they 
tend to be unreliable if not confronted with the contradictions and creativity of their 
interpretations of the rules. In such situations they tend to express a modest dissatisfaction 
with some of the rules, but they are much less harsh in their critique compared to the sceptics. 
 
3.1.3 The indifferent 
The socio-demographic traits are: Both male and female with no professional education. They 
rarely hold positions with any responsibility at all. They are not indifferent as a result of a 
strategic choice, but rather because of their incapacity to reflect upon the rules imposed on 
them. On the surface individuals in this category are remarkably similar to the enthusiasts as 
they tend to express their complete satisfaction with the rules. But confronted with 
inconsistencies they don’t try to reinterpret the rules as the enthusiasts do. They rather accept 
the inconsistencies and insist on following the rules – even when evidence to the contrary is 
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presented to them. Often they have difficulties in understanding the rules, although they insist 
on complying with them. As informants they are unreliable and it is extremely difficult to 
make them reflect upon their own behaviour and their relation with the rules. Their major 
concern seems to be not the food risks but rather the risk of getting caught in not complying 
with the rules.  
 
3.2. Common sense vs. expertise 
Knowledge about risk, risk reduction and risk reporting was the first of the main categories 
that appeared after the data coding process. Among the canteen personnel there is a 
widespread understanding concerning the necessity of strict hygiene regulations. In that sense 
most respondents emphasized the difference between cooking in one’s own kitchen and 
cooking for others as a profession as the latter implies some professional standards. Those not 
making that distinction, mostly individuals in the category of enthusiasts, usually impose the 
professional standards on their home cooking. 
Individuals within the category of sceptics emphasize their own professional expertise as a 
better source for risk reduction than the governmental hygiene rules. They tend to agree with 
some rules but consider many of them superfluous and sometimes even counterproductive as 
the rules tend to focus more on paperwork and reporting and less on actual risk reduction. In 
this sense they made a clear distinction between efforts concerning risk reduction and efforts 
concerning risk reporting. In contrast, the enthusiasts did not make this distinction and were 
generally positive in their judgment of the hygiene regulations.  
Furthermore the enthusiasts tend not to distinguish clearly among parameters such as food 
safety and food quality – the first being a precondition for the second in an almost causal 
relationship. In a sharp contrast to this, the sceptics expressed a more elaborated 
understanding of quality which they associate with gastronomy or ‘fine cooking’ and they 
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made a clear distinction between the measures taken into use in order to ensure food safety 
vis-a-vis quality. As such the sceptics had the experience that many hygiene regulations acted 
counter to their own professional ambitions to create high quality dishes. The sceptics 
generally contrasted the self-inspection programme to actual risks reduction measures. They 
see risk reduction as a practical enterprise that is integrated into their cooking procedures on 
basis of their professional education and experience. In their opinion the self-inspection 
programme is unnecessary paperwork. In contrast to this, the enthusiast favoured the self-
inspection program and see it as a firm basis for the actual risk reduction.   
One explanation for the opposing judgements of the self-inspection programme could be the 
lack of professional education among the enthusiasts: 1) their professional identity is not 
threatened in the same degree as with the sceptics who often have a professional education, 
and 2) due to their lack of education they don’t have sufficient professional competencies to 
reflect upon the hygiene risks and judge them accordingly. The strict regulations become a 
relief to them as they release them from the responsibility of using their own judgment. They 
usually feel content with the measurable risk limits such as correct temperature but less 
comfortable with situations where the standards are less quantifiable. They also tend to 
interpret the standards in a normative way, which acts counter to the intentions behind the 
standards. For example, observations of measuring the temperature of the refrigerator showed 
that some canteen workers would repeat the control in different parts of the refrigerator until 
the ‘correct’ temperature was found, not concerning themselves with the previous deviant 
results.  
If the canteen workers have to depend on their subjective judgment all respondents with only 
one exception stated that the rule of thumb in these situations was answering the question: 
Would I eat it myself? This rule of thumb is clearly in conflict with the sharp distinction 
between cooking at home and professional cooking. Whereas the latter distinction imposes 
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professional standards on the risk evaluation the former rule of thumb undermines this 
professional approach. In practise the rule of thumb allows for the canteen personnel to set 
aside, or creatively reinterpret, most of the official hygiene regulation. As such this common 
sense approach expresses the failure of implementing the governmental hygiene regulations in 
a way that makes sense to the target group.  
 
3.3. System vs. human risks  
Responsibility for risk, risk reduction and risk reporting was the second of the main categories 
that appeared after the data coding process. The preference for measurable risk limits is not 
just a trait of the enthusiast. The reporting practice concerning failure reports clearly 
demonstrates this. Failure reports are rarely completed and when they are the failures either 
concern system errors such as refrigerator breakdown or the failure of others such as delivery 
problems. What characterizes these situations is that the canteen personnel are not to blame 
for the occurrence of the risks. Although it is their responsibility to prevent and report these 
risks they cannot be held responsible for their occurrence.  
Especially the system errors had a remarkably high frequency in the failure reports. Two 
factors account for this phenomenon which can be exemplified by a refrigerator breakdown: 
1) the risk has been identified before risk exposure and prevention measures can be 
implemented, ie. discarding the food, and 2) the canteen is compensated for the costs only 
when filling out the failure report. As such many respondents treat the failure reports as a tool 
for economic compensation rather than a tool for risk reduction.  
When asked about their reporting habits most respondents admitted that according to the rules 
they ought to report more. Their dilemma is that errors are already time consuming as it is and 
that reporting about them does not help the matter. Their preference for reporting system 
errors is a result of their reluctance toward exposing themselves or their colleagues in reports 
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open to governmental control. Again, loyalty towards colleagues and the team turned out to 
be a decisive factor when it comes to risk reporting. But it is also a result of the DVFA and/or 
Compass Group hygiene department not succeeding in communicating the importance of 
completing the failure reports. As a consequence the errors are dealt with locally by the 
canteen manager confronting the employees with their misdeeds and correcting them. This is 
a widespread practice that seems more fair to the respondents compared to reporting the errors 
in official documents.  
The field observations revealed that human errors on a small scale occur with a high 
frequency without being reported. This is a result of the heavy workload and a need to meet 
the deadline when lunch is to be served. Thus washing one’s hands thoroughly is frequently 
compensated for by a swift rinse under the water tap, just as replacing the cutting board is 
compensated for by a quick flip over. If an employee is too sloppy, for instance turning over 
the cutting board twice or failing to comply with standards regarding personal hygiene, this 
employee is likely to be corrected by a colleague or the canteen manager, but nothing will be 
reported.  Human errors are only reported when a risky behaviour, such as cross 
contamination, has resulted in food poisoning among the canteen guests. But in these cases 
the risk has exploited its potentiality and by definition no longer constitutes a risk. The result 
of this reluctance towards reporting human errors is that official failure reports far from 
represent that actual risk level in the canteens.  
 
3.4. Tension between concern for productivity and concern for risk reduction  
The third of the main categories that appeared after the data coding process had to do with 
conflicts of loyalty in various situations. A major concern regarding food safety in the 
canteens is whether to discard food or let it re-circulate in the production. This decision 
captures the fundamental dilemma in balancing concerns for productivity and concerns for 
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safety. Although all respondents expressed a general understanding of the need for safety 
procedures many canteen managers, especially within the category of the sceptics, overtly 
complained about how these procedures conflict with the necessity of running a profitable 
business. Some canteens have tighter budgets than others and they obviously feel the conflict 
more. In terms of incentives the canteen manager is rewarded if budgets are met whereas risk 
reporting, although not officially expressed, is perceived to be negative and perhaps 
unwelcome feedback to the operational management. 
All the respondents expressed a higher degree of loyalty towards operational management as 
compared to the hygiene department. This should not come as a surprise: The canteen 
managers have regular meetings with district managers that represent operational 
management and the topic of these meetings is usually how to meet the budgets. As opposed 
to this, the hygiene department is situated in distant headquarters and has only occasional 
interactions with the canteen managers.  This priority is also evidenced in the organizational 
structure where the operational manager is part of senior management and the hygiene 
manager is not.  
Although concerns for profits is vital to the organization, thus imposing a certain pressure on 
the canteen manager, interviews with the non-managerial members of the canteen staff 
showed no indication of this being a major concern. Their actual behaviour, however, showed 
a widespread reluctance towards discarding food. When specifically addressing this issue it 
appeared that especially the skilled workers take a lot of professional pride in using as much 
of the available ingredients as possible. They feel a conflict of loyalty between meeting risk 
reporting standards and exploiting the potential for their professional creativity. As one 
respondent verbalized her opinion about the risk reporting procedures: “It used to be fun 
working in a kitchen. You could make use of your creative skills. Now there’s nothing joyful 
about it left. I have relied on my professional education and skills for many years, but the 
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system has no trust in our professional judgment anymore. Today you have procedures for 
everything. This kills the fun of cooking.” Thus, for the skilled professionals, concerns for 
budgets go hand in hand with professional pride in counteracting safety regulations. 
Yet another aspect of loyalty appeared to be significant when the respondents were asked 
about how their health condition affected their inclination to stay home due to illness. The 
health condition of people working with food is a critical parameter due to the risk of 
contaminating guests with infectious diseases. However, almost all respondents could recall 
incidents where they had ignored regulations and company policy and went to job even 
though they knew that their health situation was likely to increase the risk of compromising 
food safety. All respondents were motivated by their loyalty towards colleagues and their 
team. Most canteen managers and supervisors expressed the underlying conflict between 
concern for food safety and care for the individual employee on one hand and concern for 
team productivity on the other hand. Whereas canteen managers generally expressed their will 
to send sick employees home, no non-managerial staff could recall incidents where this 
actually had happened. Both managerial and non-managerial canteen workers were to various 
degrees disposed to letting their colleagues stay home, but they were all very reluctant 
towards calling themselves in sick. Team loyalty appeared to be a strong motivational factor 
that exceeds both company policies and governmental risk regulations. 
 
3.5. Trust in governmental bodies  
Trust in the governmental hygiene inspectors and the control agency was the fourth and the 
final of the main categories that appeared after the data coding process. The canteens, and in 
particular their self-inspection reports, are subject to regular control by the DVFA. On the 
general level all the respondents expressed their understanding of this system of control. But 
when relating to the control of their specific canteen many expressed their dissatisfaction and 
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stated that the control was unjust: Everyone was not measured by the same standards, 
resulting in cheap take-away restaurants with low hygiene standards often receiving relatively 
good control results. 
Several respondents referred to a period of very stringent inspections by DVFA where 
practically no one came out without critical remarks. This happened immediately after a 
turbulent episode in the Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Fisheries where food scandals were 
exposed on a daily basis in the media, criticism was raised concerning the lack of sufficient 
control visits by the DVFA and the minister finally had to resign his position. As a result of 
this the DVFA was granted a larger budget and as one of the respondents commented: “They 
had to prove that they were worth all that money and the only way to do that was to detect 
more irregularities and file more  critical reports. And even in a kitchen with the highest 
hygiene standards you can always find something if you look hard enough. It is after all a 
working place”. 
Some canteen managers, however, have a good relationship with their local DVFA inspectors. 
They can have informal dialogues and get advice on how to improve standards. Other canteen 
managers regret that this is not the case in their situation as they don’t trust the inspectors and 
therefore develop verbal strategies of ambiguity in order to answer the inspectors’ questions 
without lying and without the risk of exposing their failures to comply with the standards.  
In this sense, lack of trust in the governmental control agency and their inspection officers 
makes risk reporting a risky business for the canteen managers as it imposes yet another risk 
dimension to them: the risk of receiving negative sanctions as a result of proper reporting far 
too often outweighs the perceived risk of a negative outcome when nothing is reported. As a 
result, neither the company headquarters nor the governmental hygiene authorities get an 
accurate account for the actual risk levels. 
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4. DISCUSSION 
4.1. How the institutional context attenuates risks  
As dealt with in the previous section knowledge, responsibility, conflict of loyalty and trust 
are four important factors affecting the quality of risk reporting procedures. These factors are 
imbedded in the organizational power structures, lines of command, and communication 
channels that constitute the institutional context of risk reporting. And as evidenced, many of 
these factors contribute to a social or more precisely an institutional attenuation of risk. 
In this sense the present study offers a contribution to the large amount of studies within the 
Social Amplification of Risk Framework.(36) The framework has been successful in bringing 
together the different approaches and theories of risk analysis in a holistic conceptualization, 
but as a platform for theoretical developments the frameworks has been less successful. Most 
studies have focused on the amplification of risk, replicating existing theoretical assumptions 
concerning the rationality of risk expertise and subsequently investigating how the media or 
other societal institutions have distorted the risk proportions with a misinformed public as a 
consequence.  
Rather than taking the rationality of risk expertise for granted the present study takes a 
relational approach to exploring the conditions for risk expertise in a network where silence 
and communication are equally important factors in shaping risk perceptions. Applied to the 
Social Amplification of Risk Framework the relational approach employed in the present 
study implies a shift of focus away from an allegedly correct risk assessment to be found in a 
specific area or social station of the framework. Instead this study focuses on the relationships 
between actors and institutions that act together in producing a certain rationality of risk 
expertise. As such the approach employed in the current study seeks to exploit the full 
potential of SARF as it brings the framework into play as a platform for theory building rather 
than fitting an existing theory into the framework.   
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Although there was no intent to confirm or reject the three preliminary hypotheses, the 
empirical data suggest that H1 could account for how tensions between concerns for 
productivity vis-a-vis safety serve as an important risk attenuation factor.  H2 suggested that 
the perception of risks being under immediate personal control would contribute to risk 
attenuation as well. This hypothesis was only partly confirmed. No doubt the perception of 
being in control made the respondents underestimate the risk level of small scale risks, but in 
terms of risk reporting all respondents expressed reluctance towards reporting risks even 
when they were acknowledged. Together with a time pressure that favours productivity over 
reporting, the relationship between control and responsibility can account for this. The 
respondents deliberately avoided reporting risks stemming from human malpractice in order 
to escape sanctions and blame associated with their personal responsibility. In this sense H3 
turned out to be very relevant. The reluctance towards having one’s own malpractice exposed 
to company headquarters and the governmental control agency in most situations outweighed 
the perceived risk of the malpractice.    
 
The present study raises serious questions concerning the alleged rationality of risk expertise. 
As demonstrated in the study, risk expertise does not exist in an institutional vacuum as it is 
dependent on feedback from the risk sources. The organizational distance from risk source to 
risk expertise is long. Thus, clear and efficient communication channels for feedback from 
risk sources to risk expertise are vital if risk experts are to assess risks correctly. But as 
evidenced in the present study many factors affect the efficiency of these communication 
channels. At the most simple level the risk prevention guidelines in the self-inspection 
programme were interpreted in very dissimilar ways by the canteen personnel. The mere 
understanding of the messages in the programme was not only a question of literacy but also a 
question of heavy (and sometimes rather creative) interpretative work linking risk issues to 
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issues such as professional integrity, loyalty towards colleagues, mistrust in the governmental 
control system and various common sense considerations. 
Evidence was found that suggests the self-inspection programme as a risk detection and risk 
reporting tool to act counter to its intentions when dealing with risks caused by human action. 
Many respondents stated that they felt uncomfortable confronting colleagues with their failure 
to comply with the food safety standard and everybody rejected the idea of reporting such 
incidents as it would be disloyal toward their colleagues. The line of command and the 
communication channels within the company with the canteen managers as important 
information gatekeepers result in the encapsulation of important risk knowledge as local 
knowledge. Paradoxically this knowledge is located as far as possible from the company’s 
risk professional in the hygiene department.  
These results raise some serious doubts about the quality of the self-inspection programme as 
a risk management tool. It may be, however, that the regulatory bodies are content with not 
getting risk information that might disturb the image of ‘everything is under control’. As a 
senior canteen manager with many years of experience in the business commented during an 
interview: “The politicians want to present the public with an image of complete safety. So 
they impose regulations and hygiene procedures that in practise are impossible to comply 
with. Then we have to be creative in filling out our self-inspection reports, and when we get 
caught in cheating it is easy to point out the bad guy“. This comment points to how the risk 
reporters perceive the self-inspection programme to be made up by fantasy documents. As a 
political instrument the programme may be suitable insofar as it provides the politicians with 
sufficient technical authority when they reassure the public that risks are under control. But 
the present study has revealed how the technical assessment of risks provided by the self-
inspection programme is far from reliable. And even as a political solution it may turn out to 
be short-sighted. In the long run such fantasy documents prevent the public from exercising 
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control over the risks that they are exposed to and as such the fantasy documents corrupt the 
control mutuality(37) between the parties that produce, regulate and live with risks. 
The embeddedness of risk management in a political context points to one of the more 
delicate scopes of risk reporting, namely the distribution of responsibility. This notion of risk 
expertise as a part of a political blame game is interesting, yet underexposed. Slovic has 
already emphasized the political dimension of lay people’s risk perceptions as a driver for risk 
amplification(38), but in this case the politics of risk becomes a strong attenuating factor. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS        
The overall implication of the study is that when the risk expert or rather risk expertise is 
studied in its institutional setting, as a part of a network dependent on efficient 
communication channels for corrective feedback, the rationality of risk expertise becomes a 
questionable fact. On the one hand it becomes dubious to label the risk expertise of the 
present study as rational, knowing that important information concerning risks is never 
reported. On the other hand one might argue that the rationality of risk expertise has better 
conditions in an environment protected from input that might disturb the model-like 
cleanliness of expert risk perceptions. In this case the argument is that experts’ perceptions of 
risk do not owe their rationality to a superior level of information on the subject matter, but 
rather to a lack of information. This institutionalized ignorance is provided by a risk reporting 
procedure which to some extent is made up by fantasy documents. Surely the experts are 
aware that reporting biases occur. But in order not to interrupt with the fragile balance that 
ensures the legitimacy of the reporting system and to maintain their position as rational 
experts they have no choice but to rely on the official data.  
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Risk Communication and Citizen Engagement: What to Expect From 
Dialogue 
(Acceptet for publication in Journal of Risk Research) 
Abstract: Despite the last few decades’ devotion to deliberative methods in risk communication 
many studies point to how important challenges arise when citizens are engaged in public 
dialogue. Since the era of enlightenment public dialogue has occupied a position as a normative 
ideal for political governance. But ideals are social constructions that have a tendency to direct 
attention away from underlying conflicts. The concept of dialogue is no exception, and 
exemplified by the Danish solution to dealing with public scepticism in relations to technological 
controversies, the internationally acclaimed ‘consensus conference’, the paper seeks to offer a 
better understanding of the contemporary use of the concept of dialogue as well as its ancient 
roots. The paper argues that behind the aspirations for deliberation lie two opposing models of 
dialogue. When these two models encounter in deliberative processes, their different presumptions 
about the role of communication symmetry are likely to appear. This points to how the models 
hold very different expectations as to the dialogical outcome, thus imposing some fundamental 
conflicts regarding the political efficacy of citizen engagement as a strategy for bridging the gap 
between expert and lay attitudes to societal risks. 
 
Keywords: risk communication; citizen engagement; public deliberation; consensus conference; dialogue 
 
Introduction 
Citizen engagement in risk management has been in vogue in the recent decades (Powell and 
Colin 2008; Löfstedt and Boholm 2009). Traditional one-way communication from experts to 
the public seems to have outplayed its role in contemporary risk communication approaches. 
Yet many studies indicate that citizen engagement through dialogue is far from being a 
straightforward exercise (Rowe and Frewer 2000; Petts 2004; Seifert 2006). 
The consensus conference is one of the deliberative frameworks that have enjoyed 
much attention from practitioners as well as scholars in the recent years (Horst and Irwin 
2010). But what kind of consensus is achievable when you bring together a sample of lay 
persons to discuss technically complicated topics such as the risks concerning genetically 
modified foods? And how does the role of the expert panel fit in to the concept of deliberation 
and consensus? Do lay persons and experts share similar expectations as to the outcome when 
they engage in a dialogue? 
 While dialogue is generally treated as an uncomplicated vehicle for public 
engagement this paper argues that when experts and lay persons get together within a 
framework of public deliberation it is at the same time an encounter of two opposing models 
of dialogue. Drawing upon the Danish Consensus Conference as an example of citizen 
engagement in risk communication, the paper argues that while dialogue is sought to bridge 
the gap between expert knowledge and public concerns, the exercise of citizen engagement is 
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inclined to manifest how these two models of dialogue have very different purposes. To a 
large degree the nature of those purposes imposes some important limitations as to the 
outcome of the dialogue between experts and lay persons. The paper furthermore argues that 
this mechanism has important consequences for the efficacy of citizen engagement. 
The arguments of the paper fall in five stages. The first section briefly addresses the 
emergence of risk communication and how it has developed from one-way communication 
approaches to citizen engagement. The second section explores aspects of communication 
direction and symmetry in risk communication and public deliberation. This section draws 
upon two classical models of dialogue that during the era of enlightenment have lost some of 
their distinctness and today are treated as a unified concept of dialogue.  The third section 
draws on the Danish consensus conference as an example of public engagement to illustrate 
how the two models of dialogue and their different attitudes towards communication 
symmetry cause important problems regarding the political legitimacy as well as the authority 
of science. The fourth section deals with the problem of imperfect representation by the lay 
panel which is a consequence of the encounter of the two models of communication. This 
problem is linked to the lack of political efficacy in deliberative methods and serves as an 
explanation for the missing link between public dialogue and political decision making. The 
fifth section concludes the paper by explaining the potential for hypocrisy inherent in the 
concept of dialogue and argues that we should lower our expectations towards citizen 
engagement through dialogue. 
 
Risk communication: from deficit to dialogue 
Despite evidence that point to our society being safer than ever before, public concerns about 
risks are rising (Slovic 1993, 1999). Whether this increased risks sensibility is dealt with 
sociologically as a matter of a late modernistic societal self reflexivity (Beck 1992) or  
psychologically as a matter of biases in public perceptions of risks (Slovic 1987) it does 
impose some practical challenges to regulators that are dependent upon public acceptance of 
risks. It is out of this practical need for public acceptance that the field of risk communication 
has developed and the initial efforts to systematize an approach to risk communication rest 
upon the theoretical assumptions from the early risk perception studies (Otway and Wynne 
1989). These psychometric studies assume a clear distinction between expert analysis and lay 
people’s perceptions of risks and the task for risk communication has been to fill the gap in 
risk perceptions between experts and the public (Fischhoff 1989; Renn 1992). 
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Fischhoff (1995) describes progress in risk communication that has evolved from one-
way reactive communication efforts to two-way proactive efforts where members of the 
public are made partners.  Although this progress can be described in terms of phases, it 
constitutes a continuum with each previous ‘phase’ as a precondition for the subsequent one. 
In a more recent comment Hayenhjelm (2006) point to a tendency among scholars to 
differentiate more roughly between older and newer approaches to risk communication using 
dichotomies such as technical vs. democratic (Rowan 1994; Durant 1999), one-way vs. two-
way (Rowe and Frewer 2000), top-down vs. dialogue (Löfstedt and Boholm 2009) 
interchangeably in order to account for this progression.  
The early psychometric studies assumed risks to be real and the task for risk managers 
was to use advanced statistical tools, fault tree analysis etc. in order to “get the numbers right” 
(Fischhoff 1995). In this perspective experts have the ability to account for the actual level of 
risk whereas the perceived level of risk by lay people would be biased by various heuristics. 
Knowledge about these biases could inform risk managers about how to design an effective 
risk communication strategy. The relationship between expert analysis and lay perceptions 
was marked by a knowledge deficit (Irwin and Wynne 1996) and dissemination of risk 
knowledge from experts to the public was seen as the proper cure.  
As the psychometric paradigm matured and more attention was given to the nature of 
risk perceptions, a more nuanced understanding of the relationship between risk experts and 
lay people emerged. On the one hand studies found that ordinary people do not judge risks in 
the same narrow way that experts (are supposed to) do,  i.e. ideally according to the 
probability and severity of an adverse event (Kaplan and Garrick 1981). Instead their risk 
perceptions are informed by worldviews, ideologies and values, which are influenced by 
affect heuristics (Slovic 1999). In this sense the risk perceptions of lay people were found 
often to be richer and more sophisticated than those of the risk experts. On the other hand a 
critique of ‘the allegedly simple structure of experts’ risk perception’ (Sjöberg 2002) has 
drawn attention to how expert perceptions are less rational than the early psychometric studies 
indicated. These advancements within risk perception studies point to how risks are socially 
constructed and context dependent (Slovic 1999). Although some scholars of risk perception 
insist on granting ontological status to risk (for a discussion see Rosa 1998, 2003), the 
authority of expert knowledge as opposed to lay fallibility has been questioned. The expert-
lay dichotomy, however, has remained as a key concept in the psychometric paradigm and 
serves as an important conceptual foundation for the more in-depth studies of risk perception 
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in mental models approaches (Morgan et al. 2002). So despite progress in risk perception 
research many current models of risk communication are still influenced by the transmission 
model of communication (see Wardman 2008 for an overview). And even though 
contemporary risk perception research has called attention to the important role of contexts, 
the legacy of the subjective-objective risk dichotomy and its close affiliation with the 
transmission model has rendered these contexts blind spots in risk communication (Boholm 
2009). 
A similar, but more radical, development has occurred within the sociological 
approaches to studying how the public responds to science and technology. Under the general 
headline of ‘science communication’ emphasis has changed from ‘public understanding of 
science’ to ‘public engagement in science’ (Schäfer 2009). The distinction is crucial: In the 
first version scientific expertise occupies a more privileged position from where it is supposed 
to illuminate the public, whereas the second version rejects the assumption of the knowledge 
deficit as a valid foundation for communication between experts and the public (Wynne and 
Irwin 1996). Within this tradition the transmission model of communication has been 
abandoned together with the deficit model of risk perception. Instead approaches to risk 
communication are founded on Habermasian ideals about public dialogue and discourse 
ethics. But even these approaches have been criticized for being counterproductive in their 
emphasis on public consensus, which may lead to hegemony when they conceal legitimate 
conflicts of interest (Mouffe 2000). Furthermore the Habermasian ideal speech situation fails 
to take into account the context dependent problems and intensions of the stakeholders 
(Boholm 2009). As Wardman (2008, 1629) summarizes, “a focus on Habermasian ideals of 
‘what should be done’ has unduly limited the appreciation of real-world practices in terms of 
‘what is actually done’ and the instrumental dynamics that shape them”. 
 
Citizen engagement, deliberation and consensus through dialogue 
Citizen engagement is a well-known concept in political science, and throughout the past 
decades the active involvement of various stakeholder groups has dominated a vast number of 
theories such as corporate management (Freeman, Harrison and Wicks 2007), corporate social 
responsibility (Morsing and Schultz 2006), marketing (Prahalad and Ramaswamy 2000), 
public relations (Kent and Taylor 2002),  innovation (von Hippel and Katz 2002), science 
communication in general (Schäfer 2009) and more explicitly risk communication (Löfstedt 
129 
 
and Boholm 2009). Although engagement as a concept as well as a strategy generally is 
associated with positive attitudes and expectations, the very purpose of deliberative 
engagement is often unclear (Powell and Colin 2008), and especially in engagements 
concerning public policy making the empirical evidence has lagged significantly behind the 
normative claims of theories (Carpini, Cook and Jacobs 2004).   
John Stuart Mill argued that citizen engagement in political decision-making will 
educate people and enable them to actively address societal problems in terms of the 
collective interest (Mill 2009, 78-80). More recent arguments in favor of citizen engagement 
through public dialogue assume that engagement will empower citizens (Fischer 1999), 
enhance trust in regulators (Rowe and Frewer 2000) and ultimately improve the legitimacy of 
political decisions (Joss 2002). There are, however, important distinctions to be made from 
this array of expectations. In terms of the political efficacy of democratic participation and 
deliberation, Morrell (2005) points to the distinction between internal and external political 
efficacy. Many scholars in political science have addressed the shortfalls of citizen 
engagement; that engagement does not lead to better decisions (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 
2002, 191), that input from participants is often ignored in policy-making (Seifert 2006), and 
that participation without empowerment only results in frustrations (Arnstein 1969). These 
objections mainly deal with the lack of external political efficacy, i.e. citizen engagement 
does not contribute to the actual political decision-making. The internal political efficacy, on 
the other hand, describes the participants’ perception of personal competence and ability to 
engage actively in politics (Craig, Niemi and Sliver 1990). It deals with Stuart Mill’s 
educational aspects of public engagement, and studies suggest that internal efficacy is more 
likely to occur from citizen engagement (Morrell 2005). In line with these more modest 
expectations from citizen engagement Horst and Irwin (2010, 116) warn against “expecting 
that deliberation can be used instrumentally as a tool to establish an immediate policy-relevant 
consensus”. Instead they argue that the consensus that may occur through public deliberation 
should be regarded as a process of building collective identity and reducing social opposition. 
  
Two opposing models of dialogue 
Citizen engagement, public deliberation and consensusing are examples of the newer 
approaches to risk communication which supersede the early approaches based on one-way 
dissemination of information. The most apparent distinction between the older and the newer 
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approaches to risk communication concerns the direction of communication. This is the 
distinction that the one-way vs. two-way dichotomy is based upon. The early approaches 
operated through one-way communication whereas the newer approaches exploit the potential 
of engaging citizens in a two-way communication process. In her discussion of asymmetries 
in risk communication Hayenhjelm (2006), however points to the important distinction made 
in public relations studies between the direction of communication and the purpose of 
communication. In the attempts to account for excellence in public relations Grunig (1989) 
favors a communication model that not only operates through two-way communication 
(direction) but also attempts to balance the positions of those engaged in the communication 
situation so as to generate a symmetrical process (purpose), where mutual change in ideas, 
attitude and behavior is seen as the ideal outcome. Despite the lack of empirical evidence 
confirming the hypothesis of two-way symmetrical communication being the most excellent 
communication model, the model has maintained its position as a normative and more ethical 
communication ideal. In later discussions the model has been associated with Habermas’ ideal 
speech situation (Habermas 1984) and in contemporary studies and debates within the public 
relations community the concept of dialogue has occupied the position as the overall 
normative ideal (Kent and Taylor 2002).   
In risk and science communication the question of symmetry is crucial to the technical 
vs. democratic dichotomy. Technical communication from knowledgeable experts to the 
ignorant public presumes a fundamental inequality in terms of knowledge. Therefore it has to 
be asymmetrical. Democratic communication on the other hand rests upon strong normative 
ideals about all men being created equal sharing equal rights and therefore inequality 
constitutes a severe threat to the legitimacy of democratic communication. Democratic 
communication has to be symmetrical. The top-down vs. dialogue is a mix of both direction 
and purpose, as will become evident in the following exploration of the nature of dialogue.   
 
Symmetries and asymmetries in risk communication 
It is evident that approaches to risk communication that employ measures such as engagement 
and deliberation need to draw on dialogue as a vehicle. Although the choice of dialogue as a 
foundation for risk communication may enable us to disregard the question of communication 
direction (dialogue is always a two-way process), the more troublesome questions of 
communication purpose remain.  Hayenhjelm (2006) deals with this problem and points to 
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three different aspects of influential asymmetry in risk communication: communicative 
asymmetry, informational asymmetry and risk role asymmetry. These categories cover the 
ability to set the agenda and frame the object of debate, the knowledge and ability to assess 
risks and their consequences, and finally the power to make decisions and implement actions 
in relation to risks as well as precautionary and mitigating actions. 
 These categories are indeed relevant to risk communication, but far from exhaustive. 
In a broader societal perspective asymmetries can be associated with any social (or whatever) 
category, simply because a complex (and what Luhmann 1995 has termed a functionally 
differentiated) society operates through specialization at various levels. Specialization and 
differentiation necessitates asymmetries, and even in those cases where symmetry is preferred 
(and that might be the case in some aspects of risk communication) it seems rather optimistic 
to expect that communication and dialogue can solve all problems of asymmetry. In fact, 
many asymmetries such as institutionalized power relations serve to selectively prevent 
people from getting access to certain communication arenas. In this sense asymmetries have 
the same function as trust; they reduce the need for communication in order to facilitate 
smoother decision making and routinize social practice. Still other asymmetries, e.g. in terms 
of knowledge, are the very precondition for communication. This is the case in the 
educational systems. It would be pointless for students to go to universities if no knowledge 
asymmetries existed in relation to their professors. In short, sometimes symmetrical relations 
in communication situations are preferable and sometimes they are not. Not surprisingly 
Heyelhjelm (2006) finds it difficult to account for exactly when in her three categories 
asymmetry is undesirable.  
Nevertheless communication asymmetry constitutes a problem to the dialogical 
approaches to risk communication that embrace concepts such as engagement and 
deliberation. The reason for this may be that when the word dialogue is used in a deliberative 
context it affects the meaning of the word far beyond its two-way directional features. It 
relates, in a highly normative way, to the very intentions of dialogue, i.e. the communication 
purpose. This paper argues that the fundamental conflict of symmetry has its roots in how we 
define dialogue, and that these roots are crucial in shaping our expectations towards the 
dialogical outcome. 
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Truth and politics 
In a short but noteworthy essay Hannah Arendt (1961) offers an explanation of the 
relationship between truth and politics in our modern society; a society in which the classical 
distinction between the rational truth of the philosopher and the mere opinion of citizens has 
been erased by enlightenment ideals about public knowledge.  
Before the concept of public opinion gained normative validity beyond its immediate 
ancient political-legislative domain it was possible to make a clear distinction between two 
opposing expectations as to the dialogical outcome. The philosophical dialogue would aim at 
reaching rational truths whereas the political dialogue would lead to mere opinions. In a 
similar vein Linder (2001, 653) traces our contemporary understanding of dialogue back to 
two classical models of dialogue in Greek antiquities, namely “Plato’s Socratic interrogations 
in pursuit of self-knowledge and virtue, and the Athenian deliberations for collective 
governance”.  
The Socratic model seeks to reach a truth which already exists but is hidden from the 
view of at least one of the participants in the dialogue. Socrates, who firmly believed that he 
himself had found the truth, compared his own role in the dialogue with that of the midwife. 
The interlocutor of the Socratic dialogue is to reach the truth on his own, and Socrates can 
offer nothing but guidance in that process. The point is that nothing new emerges from the 
dialogue, because the truth already exists. Dialogue has no other purpose than to bring forth 
that truth. A similar conception of dialogue can be found in the work of Gadamer and Freud, 
and the ensuing tradition of psychoanalysis, like other therapeutic practices, rests upon this 
model of dialogue. The professional treats the dialogical input from the patient as symptoms 
and his task is to arrange those symptoms in order to make a correct diagnosis. 
 The Athenian model, on the other hand, seeks not truth but commitment which is to 
emerge as a new construction through the dialogue. This model of dialogue is inherently 
political and it is characterized by its ability to create consensus as a foundation for decision 
making as well as to create cultural bonds between the citizens (Linder 2001). This model of 
dialogue does not disregard the world as it is, but, as a vehicle for decision making, its 
perspective is the future rather than the existing world. As Arendt points out, the political 
dialogue aims at changing the world and in order to achieve this, potentiality and openness 
towards the future is required (Arendt 1961, 251). In this respect the configuration of truth 
often constitutes a barrier to the political project, because as Mercier de la Rivière (1767, 185) 
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mentions, the truth is despotic in its nature; it rejects the very idea of openness and 
negotiation. For this reason truth and politics are often in conflict with each other, and in the 
Athenian model of dialogue the truth holds no prominent position as in the Socratic model. 
The main point is that rather than discovering what already exists, the outcome of the 
Athenian model is something new which emerges through the process of dialogue. A similar 
conception of dialogue is to be found in the work of Dewey and Habermas as well as in 
contemporary efforts to promote public deliberation and deliberative decision making.  
In returning to the discussion of symmetrical vs. asymmetrical approaches to risk 
communication, the two models of dialogue have very different normative claims on the topic 
of symmetry. The Athenian model of dialogue occurs between equals whereas the Socratic 
version  “presumes differential enlightenment, and thus inequality, as to insight, capacity, 
reasoning abilities, and so on, not only between participants but especially between 
participants and everybody else” (Linder 2001, 654). The Socratic model assumes 
asymmetrical relations as a basis for knowledge production, whereas the Athenian model 
needs symmetrical relations as a legitimate foundation for commitment and collective 
governance. 
  
Consequences for risk communication 
Arendt identifies a dissolvement of the ancient opposition between rational truth and opinion 
in the era of enlightenment. But her main point is that the tension between truth and politics 
has continued within the domain of factual truths, because facts (as opposed to rational 
abstractions) belong to the same realm as opinions (Arendt 1961, 238). This is the realm of 
politics, as policy making is about changing facts.  
Contemporary literature on risk recognizes this political dimension and makes a clear 
distinction between the rational domain of risk analysis as opposed to risk management which 
is inherently political (Löfsted and Boholm 2009). According to this distinction the task of 
scientific expertise is to inform policy making, so that the decisions can be made on a rational 
foundation. Despite its disadvantages the initial one-way models of risk communication 
ensured that the rationality of risk expertise is kept separate from the ‘irrationality’ of policy 
making. But from the perspective of scientific experts their message uncovering the rational 
truth about the risk subject gets somehow distorted on its way from experts to the public. The 
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communication flow through political institutions and most notably the media contaminates 
the message with irrationality and the result is ungrounded risk amplification (see e.g. 
Koshland 1989; Abelson 1993).  
In this respect a two-way dialogue through citizen engagement ought to be a better 
alternative, because this approach enables the risk communication to bypass the amplifying 
stations as accounted for in the Social Amplification of Risk Framework (Kasperson et al. 
1988). But citizen engagement has its price. When scientists and the public meet, it is at the 
same time two different models of dialogue that meet. The natural and technical sciences that 
perform risk analysis rest upon ontological and epistemological paradigms that correspond to 
the Socratic model of dialogue. But like policy making risk analysis is oriented towards the 
future, and despite efforts to eliminate uncertainty, the very concept of risk contains an 
element of potentiality which is open to political exploitation. Because of this openness it 
becomes difficult to uphold a clear distinction between risk analysis and risk management 
when one-way risk communication is replaced by a two-way dialogue. 
The two-way dialogue often occurs in a framework of citizen engagement and 
deliberation that is compatible with the Athenian model of dialogue. This paper argues that 
when the Socratic and the Athenian models of dialogue are confronted with each other the old 
conflict between truth and politics reappears in a new disguise and with new challenges. The 
following example from the Danish Consensus Conference will illustrate some of these 
challenges. 
 
A case in point: The Danish Consensus Conference 
The Danish consensus conference is one of the methods employed by the Danish Board of 
Technology. The board was founded in 1986 on the basis of public discussions about new 
controversial biotechnologies. Over the years the consensus conference has grown into 
becoming an internationally renowned concept. In a four-day consensus conference a 
randomly picked citizen panel of 14-16 lay persons is confronted with the task of reaching 
consensus about a controversial technological topic of current interest. Their task is not to 
reach any scientific truths, but rather to reach an agreement about how society should deal 
with this new technology.  
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The lay persons in the conference panel are picked from a source of 2,000 randomly 
selected citizens. The panel is self-selected as participants apply for participation. The 
planning group from the Danish Board of Technology then selects 12-14 participants to form 
a panel that is representative in terms of age, gender, employment and geographical location. 
In the selection process, emphasis is also given to the fact that members are both open-minded 
in relation to the conference topic as well as interested in debating the issue. 
Prior to the actual conference the panel of lay persons participate in two preparatory 
weekend sessions and receive a report that provide the them with “a varied and 
comprehensive view of the most important attitudes, conflicts, problems and development 
trends relating to the subject”, so as to enlighten participant with “nuanced, balanced and 
versatile knowledge” (Danish Board of Technology). 
On the basis of this knowledge the panel asks questions to experts in the field during 
the conference. Similar to the preparatory information, the participating experts represent 
different views on the topic. Their main purpose is to bring their technical expertise into play. 
On the basis of the answers received from experts, the panel discusses the topic and assesses 
how a given technology should be used and sets out any preferences for its development”. 
When the panel has reached consensus, they formulate a final document that is sent to 
member of the parliament and other important decision makers (Danish Board of 
Technology).  
Despite the ambiguous nature of the problems usually addressed in consensus 
conferences, the method has proved itself successful in terms of achieving its overall 
objective, i.e. reaching consensus on a difficult topic. But despite its apparent benefits, the 
method has been criticized for its failure to affect political decisions (Horst and Irwin 2010).  
Similar to many other frameworks for public deliberation the consensus conference is 
successful in terms of internal political efficacy, but fails when it comes to external political 
efficacy.  
 
The encounter of two models of dialogue 
The main purpose of the panel is for its participant to debate the topic in question and to reach 
consensus. As such their communicative effort resembles the Athenian model of dialogue 
where “participants interact with talk to form commitments, common purpose, and to reaffirm 
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the symbolic bonds of culture” (Linder 2001, 655). In line with these dialogical expectations 
Horst and Irwin (2010) infer that consensusing in the Danish model ought to be measured not 
solely by its political performativity but in a broader perspective of its impact on building up 
institutional and national identity.  
Nevertheless the citizen panel consisting of lay people is to make its judgment on the 
basis of solid scientific knowledge. This part of the communication process is similar to the 
Socratic model of dialogue as the purpose of expert involvement and the preparatory sessions 
is to inform the citizen panel about the scientific knowledge that surrounds the technological 
issue in question. 
 
Two threats to the political legitimacy of the deliberative project 
Both the Athenian and the Socratic models of dialogue seem to be present in the consensus 
conference. Since the two modes of dialogue share dissimilar expectations as to the nature of 
the dialogical outcome it becomes reasonable to raise questions regarding what kind of 
consensus the conference is aiming at as well as the broader societal usefulness of this 
consensus. In the Athenian model dialogue occurs between equals whereas the Socratic model 
is based upon different levels of enlightenment among participants and therefore presumes 
inequality as to knowledge, reasoning abilities etc. 
This inequality constitutes two threats to the legitimacy of this strategy for 
deliberation: First and foremost the issue of dialogue between experts and lay people. 
Although there is emphasis on bringing together a diverse range of scientific approaches to 
the topic, the contribution from experts are of a different nature that the mere opinions of lay 
people. The purpose of engaging experts is to narrow down the knowledge deficit. This 
involves a strong element of communication asymmetry which constitutes a challenge to the 
whole setup of the deliberative engagement. The solution to this challenge is to turn upside 
down the traditional hierarchy between knowledge and doxa by staging the citizen panel as 
the highest authority in a tribunal where science is on trial. But the asymmetry is reversed 
rather than eliminated and the maneuver appears to be of merely symbolic significance.  
The other thing that threatens the legitimacy has to do with representativity. The very 
attempt to diminish the knowledge deficit implies that the citizen panel in the very process 
loses its significance as representative of the (ignorant) public. Obviously the participants do 
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not become scientific experts, but rather enlightened lay persons, much similar to clients or 
patients in a therapeutic treatment. As such they differ from the majority of their fellow 
citizens still in need of a cure to their ignorance.  
 
A threat to the scientific authority of risk expertise 
It seems that despite attempts to facilitate a symmetrical dialogue the consensus conference 
rests upon some elements from the old model of risk communication. In a proper deliberative 
dialogue all interlocutors should be equal and willing to change their beliefs and attitudes on 
the basis of the better argument. But if the risk experts were to accept this principle of 
dialogue, the deliberative approach would constitute a severe threat to the foundation for their 
knowledge.  In her discussion of the relationship between truth and opinion Arendt points to a 
mechanism that transforms the truth of the philosopher into just another opinion the very 
moment he steps down from his lofty isolation and interferes with the political game. If we 
accept these rather gloomy premises the consensus conference with its mixture of science and 
politics authorizes and institutionalizes a loss of the authority of science.1 
 John Stuart Mill had high expectations as to the public dialogue. As he argued: “It is 
better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied 
than a fool satisfied” (Mill 1867, 14). But a truth-seeking scientist confronted with a panel of 
lay people may feel inclined to rephrase those famous words: Does public engagement in 
science run the risk of dissatisfying the Socratic interrogations in pursuit of truth on behalf of 
satisfying opinions that might be foolish? Or to be more precise: Is it feasible and desirable 
for science to adapt to a consensus-building mode of dialogue rather that a truth-seeking one?  
 
The problem of imperfect representation  
In order to confirm the authority of scientific risk expertise scientists need to insist on a 
Socratic model of communication. Overcoming knowledge deficits constitutes the foundation 
for this model and the only way to so is to engage in asymmetric communication. This may 
represent a notion of discomfort to the deliberative aspirations of a consensus conference, but 
the practical consequences are minor. Once enlightened by scientific expertise the citizen 
panel can go on with forming its opinions within a deliberative framework. But during the 
process of enlightenment the panel will be transformed. The experts that are inclined to look 
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upon the input from the panel as symptoms of ignorance, will so to speak have cured (or at 
least improved the condition of) their patients. While the process of this transformation may 
not constitute major practical consequences to the deliberative project, the result of this 
process certainly does. The members of the citizen panel who were picked randomly to 
represent the public at large have lost their capacity to represent the public as a result of their 
enlightenment2.  
This matter of imperfect representation is a severe threat to the deliberative project, 
because similar to other modes of citizen engagement the consensus conference needs a 
perfect representation in order to exploit the dialogical outcome in political decision making. 
If the consensus agreed upon in the conference no longer represents the concerns of the 
general public, it cannot serve as a viable means for political decisions. Paradoxically the 
same process of enlightenment that leads to internal political efficacy renders external 
political efficacy impossible: the members of the panel will improve their ability to 
understand and engage actively in the debate but the output of that debate will no longer 
reflect the opinions of the general public. 
The problem of imperfect representation is well known in the stakeholder literature. 
Many stakeholder groups are not genuine stakeholders but what Starik has termed proxy 
stakeholders (Starik 1994, 1995). They are often formal organizations that represent the true 
stakeholders that for different reasons cannot voice their opinion themselves. The construction 
of representation by proxy contains an important legitimacy problem. How can we for 
example know to which degree Greenpeace represents the whales? The truth is that we cannot 
and therefore the legitimate claims of proxy stakeholders are diffuse (Mitchell, Agle and 
Woods 1997). 
Within the domain of risk management Löfstedt (2005) accounts for the same 
phenomena. Löftedt found that under certain circumstances by-passing the dialogue with 
interest organizations will result in more successful risk communication even though the 
approach would be based on asymmetrical one-way communication. As a result of these 
findings Löfstedt rejects the conventional wisdom of risk management that prescribes citizen 
engagement and stakeholder dialogue as a universal cure. Instead Löfstedt suggests that risk 
managers proceed on a case-by-case basis and test for trust among the afflicted parties. 
Successful risk management is contingent upon various factors and many studies have 
confirmed that trust is a crucial factor (Slovic 1999; Löfstedt and Boholm 2009). Apart from 
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trust Löfstedt points to the combination of low uncertainty and complexity as a viable basis 
for one-way risk communication. This is much in line with the insights from Social Presence 
Theory that relate media choice to the level of ambiguity (Short, Williams and Christie 1976) 
and the more recent risk governance models such as RISCOM (Andersson et al. 2006) and 
IRGC (Renn and Walker 2007) that reserve deliberative approaches for ambiguous risks 
characterized by a high degree of uncertainty. According to Social Presence Theory, a simple 
and unambiguous message calls for a lean medium in order to ensure successful 
communication. If the message is highly ambiguous a rich medium such as face-to-face 
communication is required. The consensus conference, like most current deliberative 
approaches, is designed to deal with technological risks characterized by a high degree of 
uncertainty and complexity. But the choice of a rich media is expensive and may not be worth 
the effort if the only results are internal political efficacy among the lay panelists and 
knowledge about the public concerns among the participating experts. Löfstedt (2009) comes 
to a similar conclusion and recommends face-to-face ethnographic interviews as a better 
source for knowledge about public concerns. 
 
Concluding remarks: The hypocrisy of dialogue 
Dialogue is often suggested as a solution to controversial, complex and ambiguous problems 
that traditional strategic, coercive or hierarchical modes of coordination cannot solve (Linder 
2001). In light of the simple dichotomies of so-called older and newer approaches to risk 
communication citizen engagement through dialogue appears to be a reasonable solution. In 
many cases one-way communication cannot do the job, because the risks are too complex and 
ambiguous. But the failure of one-way communication does not necessarily mean that two-
way communication and dialogical approaches will be successful. The concept of dialogue is 
promising, but perhaps it promises too much.  
Debates about the supremacy of two-way symmetrical communication in the public 
relations literature lead to a rejection of the two-way symmetrical model as a basis for best 
practice. Empirical data suggested that communication is more successful when public 
relations departments employ a mix of different models (Grunig et al. 2002, 349 ff.).  But to 
many scholars and practitioners the two-way symmetrical model still enjoys a position as a 
normative ideal because of its alleged ethical nature (Grunig 2006).  Other scholars have 
contended that symmetry and dialogue are problematic ideals (Stoker and Tusinski 2006). 
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Since the era of enlightenment public dialogue has enjoyed a prominent position in 
western democracies and “under this normative democratic view, participation is self-
evidently a good thing in its own right, without the need for justification” (Stirling 2005, 221). 
Because of this position the concept of public dialogue is open to strategies of hypocrisy. The 
apparent unification of truth and opinion that Arendt (1961) accounts for and which forms the 
basis for Rawl’s concept of public reasoning and Habermas’ idea about a rationality potential 
is a fragile construction. Underneath the surface we find elements of the two classical models 
of dialogue where the Socratic pursuit for truth is clearly separated from the Athenian 
deliberations for governance. The consensus conference exemplifies how, in situations of 
controversy, complexity and ambiguity, these two models rather than coming together will 
manifest their fundamental differences. Because of this the deliberative aspirations behind the 
consensus conference are prone to failure.  
But if the results are poor and the deliberative project rests upon such a fragile 
construction, why is citizen engagement so attractive to regulators? The concepts of 
‘organized hypocrisy’ coined by Swedish organization scholar Nils Brunsson (2003, 2009) 
may be able to explain this preference for dialogue. Brunsson has observed how institutions 
and organizations in ambiguous situations with conflicting stakeholder demands are likely to 
split up the natural chain of decision making where communication informs decision making 
which eventually leads to action. By dislocating the element of communication public 
dialogue can serve as a surrogate for influence on decision and action. This strategy of 
hypocrisy might not completely satisfy the worried citizens but it may reduce the intensity of 
their protests because at least they have had the opportunity to voice their concerns. If we 
accept this explanation it would be wise to adjust our expectations towards public engagement 
through dialogue. In light of the troublesome nature of dialogue a short answer to the question 
of what to expect is: Expect less. 
 
 
Notes 
1. A similar threat to the professional expertise has been voiced in relation to the 
American jury system. Although the legitimacy of jury verdicts is rarely questioned by 
professionals in the legal system (Jonakait 2003: 81ff.) criticism has been raised as to 
the capacity of lay persons to understand complex (and especially technical) issues in 
trials (see e.g. Daniels 1989). This criticism has been pushed to extremes by judge 
Jerome Frank who stated that “while the jury can contribute nothing of value so far as 
the law is concerned, it has infinite capacity for mischief, for twelve men can easily 
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misunderstand more law in one minute than the judge can explain in an hour” (cited 
from Cecil, Hans and Wiggins 1991, note 37). 
2. In many cases the problem of representation arises even before a citizen panel come to 
exist. As Löftedt (1999) point to participants are usually self-selecting despite efforts 
to select them randomly. Because of this they do not represent the general public. 
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